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I. INTRODUCTION 
When Congress passed the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)1 in 1968, 
it paved the way for lenders to make certain uniform disclosures in 
 
* Tallahassee Alumni Professor of Law, Florida State University. 
1. Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1601-1667f (2012)). 
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consumer credit transactions.2 It was a step in the right direction because 
until then lenders could decide on their own disclosures, and there was 
no consensus about the kind of information they should give to 
consumers.3 Both TILA and Regulation Z, which implements it, require 
creditors to follow a standard format, so that consumers will have the 
opportunity to compare the cost of credit and make intelligent decisions 
about the offers they receive in the marketplace.4 No longer can a post-
TILA creditor gain a competitive advantage by formulating its offer of 
credit to make it seem more attractive than it really is, because all 
creditors are bound by the same rules. For example, a creditor has to 
express a loan’s finance charge as an annual percentage rate rather than 
merely disclosing the loan’s interest rate.5 This approach takes into 
account any charge that the lender imposes incident to, or as a condition 
of, the extension of credit.6 
 
 2.  The purpose of TILA is “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the 
consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid 
the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing 
and credit card practices.” 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2012). A creditor must disclose information to the 
consumer in a particular transaction in accordance with regulations promulgated by the Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection, which took over jurisdiction from the Federal Reserve Board after 
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 1061(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 2036 (2010). Regulation Z prescribes the disclosures that a 
creditor must make and even requires certain disclosures to be more conspicuous than others. See 12 
C.F.R. § 1026.17(a)(2) (2014). 
 3.  The legislative history of TILA gave some indication of the problems as follows: 
With respect to rate, some creditors employ an “add on” rate, which is based on the 
original balance of the obligation as opposed to the declining balance. This has the effect 
of understating the simple annual rate by approximately 50 percent. 
Other segments of the credit industry, such as credit unions and small loan companies 
employ monthly rates. Although for some it is a simple matter to multiply the monthly 
rate by 12, the evidence before the committee indicates that many people are not aware 
of the true cost of credit when it is expressed on a monthly basis. 
Other creditors add a number of additional fees or charges to the basic finance charge, 
such as credit investigation fees, credit life insurance, and various “service” charges. 
This permits a creditor to quote a low rate while actually earning a higher yield through 
the additional fees and charges. 
H.R. REP. NO. 90-1040, at 13 (1967), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962, 1970. 
 4.  Congress believed that uniform disclosures would allow consumers to compare the cost 
of credit and make informed decisions. See id. TILA’s purpose was “to assure a meaningful 
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer [would] be able to compare more readily the various 
credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit.” 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2012). 
 5.  Regulation Z indicates that the finance charge includes “any charge payable directly or 
indirectly by the consumer and imposed directly by the creditor as an incident to or a condition of 
the extension of credit.” 12 C.F.R. § 1026.4(a) (2014). Congress authorized the Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection to issue regulations to carry out the purposes of TILA. 15 U.S.C. § 
1604(a) (2012). 
 6.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.4(a) (2014). The right of rescission 
does not, however, apply to a mortgage obtained to finance acquisition of the consumer’s principal 
dwelling. 12 C.F.R. §§ 1026.23(f)(1), 1026.2(a)(24) (2014). 
2
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A creditor’s disclosure obligation relates not only to the cost of 
credit, but also to the consumer’s right to rescind a transaction in which 
the consumer gives the creditor a security interest in his principal 
dwelling.7 Even if a creditor makes no disclosure mistakes in such a 
transaction, a consumer has a right to rescind the transaction within three 
business days, and the creditor must advise the consumer of that right.8 
If a creditor does not meet its disclosure obligations in a rescindable 
transaction, a consumer’s right to rescind may last as long as three 
years.9 There is, however, some disagreement about what a consumer 
must do within that three-year period in order to rescind. Some courts 
take the position that a consumer need only give the creditor written 
notice of his rescission within that period;10 others go further and require 
the consumer to sue within the three-year period if the creditor refuses to 
cooperate with the consumer.11 It is not surprising that courts disagree 
about what a consumer must do to rescind a transaction because TILA 
provides that a consumer’s right to rescind shall “expire” three years 
after consummation of the transaction.12 Those courts that require a 
consumer to sue within that period rely on the United States Supreme 
Court’s characterization of the statute, in Beach v. Ocwen Federal 
Bank,13 as a limitation on the right itself, thus not allowing a consumer to 
use the right to rescind as a defense in recoupment after the expiration of 
the three-year period.14 This Article will consider the different judicial 
approaches to the three-year limitation that have arisen in this area. 
The right of rescission has produced disagreement in other ways. 
Although Regulation Z lays out the procedure for implementing a 
 
 7.  15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(a)(1) (2014). 
 8.  Regulation Z provides that “[t]he consumer may exercise the right to rescind until 
midnight of the third business day following consummation, delivery of the notice [of the right to 
rescind], or delivery of all material disclosures, whichever occurs last.” 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(a)(3)(i) 
(2014). 
 9.  Regulation Z provides that “[i]f the required notice or material disclosures are not 
delivered, the right to rescind shall expire 3 years after consummation, upon transfer of all the 
consumer’s interest in the property, or upon sale of property, whichever occurs first.” Id. 
 10.  See, e.g., Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2012); Leonard v. 
Bank of Am. NA, No. 10-C-0814, 2012 WL 3001266 (E.D. Wis. July 23, 2012); Briosos v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, 737 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Herzog v. Countrywide Home Loans (In re 
Hunter), 400 B.R. 651 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009). 
 11.  See Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2012); McOmie-Gray v. 
Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 2012); Phillippi v. Beneficial Loan & Thrift 
Co., No. 10-4281 (SRN/JJG), 2012 WL 684873 (D. Minn. Mar. 2, 2012). 
 12.  15 U.S.C. § 1635(f). 
 13.  Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410 (1998). 
 14.  In Beach, the Supreme Court made the point that TILA “permits no federal right to 
rescind, defensively or otherwise, after the 3-year period of § 1635(f) has run.” Id. at 419. 
3
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consumer’s rescission,15 some creditors become uneasy about following 
that procedure when they are not sure a consumer will be able to return 
the money or property that is the subject of the transaction.16 One can 
readily understand a creditor’s concern in this context because 
Regulation Z dictates that the creditor’s security interest becomes void 
when a consumer rescinds a transaction.17 Taken literally, this suggests 
that a consumer’s rescission terminates the lien that protects the creditor, 
and the creditor may then be left unsecured without any assurance that 
the consumer is willing or able to tender the amount due the creditor. 
Some courts react to this problem by requiring a consumer to plead in 
his complaint that he has the ability to tender, failing which a creditor 
will prevail on a motion to dismiss.18 Those courts see it as pointless to 
proceed with a consumer’s rescission if the consumer cannot return the 
creditor’s money or property. Other courts seek a solution by 
conditioning the removal of the creditor’s lien on the consumer’s 
performance.19 They justify conditional rescission on the basis of their 
 
 15.  See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(d) (2014). 
 16.  Regulation Z allows a consumer to keep the creditor’s money or property until the 
creditor returns “any money or property that has been given to anyone in connection with the 
transaction.” Id. § 1026.23(d)(2)-(3). Furthermore, the creditor must take any action necessary to 
terminate its security interest. Id. § 1026.23(d)(2). 
 17.  Regulation Z provides that “[w]hen a consumer rescinds a transaction, the security 
interest giving rise to the right of rescission becomes void and the consumer shall not be liable for 
any amount, including any finance charge.” Id. § 1026.23(d)(1). 
 18.  See Yamamoto v. Bank of N.Y., 329 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that a court 
may alter the rescission procedures before trial when it finds that consumer has no ability to pay 
back the proceeds); Abdel-Malak v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 505, 512 (D. 
Md. 2010) (failing to halt foreclosure sale on the basis of rescission because consumer did not assert 
ability to tender); Briosos v. Wells Fargo Bank, 737 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
(stating that “Plaintiff must set forth factual allegations demonstrating that he has the resources (or 
may readily obtain them) to be in a position to tender the loan proceeds”); Cheche v. Wittstat Title 
& Escrow Co., LLC, 723 F. Supp. 2d 851, 858 (E.D. Va. 2010) (finding that consumer must provide 
“sufficient factual allegations demonstrating a ‘plausible’ ability to tender” in order to survive 
motion to dismiss); Webb v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., No. 1:10-CV-0307-TWT-CCH, 2010 WL 
2950353, at *4 (N.D. Ga. July 1, 2010) (finding that plaintiffs’ claim should be dismissed because 
they did not plead facts showing that they had the ability to repay loan); ING Bank v. Korn, No. 
C09-124Z, 2009 WL 1455488, at *1 (W.D. Wash. May 22, 2009) (requiring consumer to plead 
ability to tender). 
 19.  See Am. Mortg. Network, Inc. v. Shelton, 486 F.3d 815, 821 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding that 
unconditional rescission was not appropriate where plaintiffs were unable to tender loan proceeds); 
Williams v. Homestake Mortg. Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1142 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that “a court 
may impose conditions that run with the voiding of a creditor’s security interest upon terms that 
would be equitable and just to the parties in view of all surrounding circumstances”); Ayon v. JP 
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. CV F 12-0355 LJO SKO, 2012 WL 1189455, at *12 (E.D. Cal. 
April 9, 2012) (conditioning consumer’s rescission on meaningful tender); Dawson v. Thomas (In 
re Dawson), 411 B.R. 1, 43 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2008) (conditioning rescission on payment of proceeds), 
aff’d, 437 B.R. 15 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2010); Robertson v. Strickland (In re Robertson), 333 B.R. 894, 
904 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005) (holding consumer’s rescission conditional on tender); US Bank Nat’l 
4
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equitable jurisdiction, supported by regulatory language that allows a 
court to modify the rescission procedures relating to the parties’ 
performance.20 Although Regulation Z clearly sets out this judicial 
power, it says nothing about affecting the voidness of the creditor’s 
security interest when a consumer rescinds, and courts have had to 
grapple with this omission in trying to fashion a remedy for a rescinding 
consumer.21 This Article will discuss the various approaches that courts 
have taken in restoring the parties to the status quo ante. 
A creditor can also run into difficulty by not giving the consumer a 
clear and conspicuous notice of the consumer’s right to rescind a 
transaction.22 The clarity of the creditor’s notice is sometimes called into 
question when the creditor gives a specific date for rescission that 
conflicts with the provision that allows the consumer to rescind until 
three days after consummation, delivery of all material disclosures, or 
delivery of the notice of the right to rescind, whichever happens last.23 
 
Ass’n v. Guillaume, 38 A.3d 570, 589 (N.J. 2012) (holding that foreclosure court could deny 
rescission if consumer could not tender balance of loan). 
 20.  See Am. Mortg. Network, 486 F.3d at 820 (finding that “[t]he trial court in exercising its 
powers of equity, could have either denied rescission or based the unwinding of the transaction on 
the borrowers’ reasonable tender of the loan proceeds”); Yamamoto, 329 F.3d at 1173 (holding that 
“court may impose conditions on rescission that assure that the borrower meets her obligations once 
the creditor has performed its obligations”); Brown v. Nat’l Permanent Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 683 
F.2d 444, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (finding that court had equitable power to condition rescission on 
consumer’s return of loan proceeds); Bradford v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., 838 F. Supp. 2d 424, 433 
(E.D. Va. 2012) (finding that § 1635(b) vests equitable jurisdiction in courts to decide “whether and 
how to effect rescission”); Abdel-Malak, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 512 (denying equitable rescission 
remedy because consumers were unable to repay their loan and their future ability to do so was 
speculative); AFS Fin., Inc. v. Burdette, 105 F. Supp. 2d 881, 882 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (holding 
rescission and removal of security interest conditioned on consumer’s repayment of loan). 
 21.  TILA provides that “[t]he procedures prescribed by [§ 1635(b)] shall apply except when 
otherwise ordered by a court.” 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2012). Regulation Z provides similarly that 
“[t]he procedures outlined in paragraphs (d)(2) and (3) of [§ 1026.23] may be modified by court 
order.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(4) (2014). 
 22.  A creditor must give two copies of the notice of the right to rescind to each consumer 
who has the right to rescind. The notice must clearly and conspicuously declare the details about the 
consumer’s right to rescind. See 12 C.F.R. §226.23(b)(1). 
 23.  The Rescission Model Form published by the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 
reads in pertinent part: 
You have a legal right under federal law to cancel this transaction, without cost, within 
three business days from whichever of the following events occurs last: 
(1)  the date of the transaction, which is _____________; or 
(2) the date you received your Truth in Lending disclosures; or 
(3) the date you received this notice of your right to cancel. 
12 C.F.R. pt. 226, app. H-8 (2014). In the last paragraph of the model notice, the language reads: 
If you cancel by mail or telegram, you must send the notice no later than midnight of 
_____ (date) (or midnight of the third business day following the latest of the three 
events listed above). If you send or deliver your written notice to cancel some other way, 
it must be delivered to the above address no later than that time. 
5
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The disclosure of a specific rescission date is not problematic if the 
creditor makes all the required disclosures and accurately states the date 
of consummation. 
Confusion can occur, however, if the creditor fails to meet its 
responsibilities and leaves the consumer in a quandary about the 
deadline for rescinding. Occasionally, the creditor will omit the specific 
deadline for rescission and leave it to the consumer to work out the date, 
doing his own computations about when the three business days will 
expire.24 It is arguable that a consumer should be able to rely on the 
specific date for rescission designated by the creditor and that the 
creditor’s failure to provide accurate information leaves the consumer 
unsure about his time for rescinding. If the rescission notice contains a 
deadline that has already passed, the consumer will be even more 
confused about his right to rescind.25 In that event, a court has to decide 
what to do about the conflict between the stated rescission deadline and 
the narrative in the rescission notice relating to the consumer’s right to 
 
Id. A consumer will frequently allege a violation when the creditor gives a specific date for the 
consumer to send a rescission notice that conflicts with the date representing the third business day 
following the latest of the three events mentioned in the first paragraph. When this happens, a court 
must decide whether the creditor has made a clear and conspicuous disclosure of the consumer’s 
right to rescind. 
 24.  See Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 791 F. 2d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(holding that failure to fill in expiration date constituted violation); Little v. Bank of Am., N.A., 769 
F. Supp. 2d 954, 962 (E.D. Va. 2011) (holding that consumer stated claim for rescission where 
creditor’s notice of right to cancel failed to state deadline for rescission); Reynolds v. D & N Bank, 
792 F. Supp. 1035, 1038 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (creditor committed violation by failing to fill in date 
when right of rescission expired); New Maine Nat’l Bank v. Gendron, 780 F. Supp. 52, 57 (D. Me. 
1991) (holding that creditor’s failure to fill in expiration date extended consumer’s right to rescind). 
But see Melfi v. WMC Mortg. Corp., 568 F.3d 309, 313 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that consumer 
received adequate notice about the right to rescind even though creditor did not state deadline for 
rescission); Kelly v. Performance Credit Corp., No. 08-40159, 2009 WL 3300030, at *5 (D. Mass. 
April 14, 2009) (holding that the creditor’s omission of the deadline for rescission did not violate 
statute). 
 25.  In Palmer v. Champion Mortgage, the consumer argued that the creditor’s notice about 
the right to rescind was confusing because it stated a deadline for rescission that had already passed 
when the consumer received the notice. Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 
2006). Despite this, the court found in the creditor’s favor because the consumer could have 
determined the actual deadline by calculating when midnight of the third business day would arrive 
following the latest of the three events listed in the notice. See id. at 29. The court could not see how 
“any reasonable alert person—that is, the average consumer—reading the Notice would be drawn to 
the April 1 deadline without also grasping the twice-repeated alternative deadlines.” Id. The court’s 
position was that even if the specified deadline (April 1) was wrong, the consumer still could arrive 
at the correct deadline by referring to midnight of the third business day following the last of three 
events (consummation, date the disclosures were received, date the notice of the right to rescind was 
received). The basic question is whether the phrase “or midnight of the third business day following 
the latest of the three events listed above” is intended as an alternative guide for arriving at the 
correct rescission deadline or whether it is merely descriptive of the deadline date. See NAT’L 
CONSUMER LAW CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING § 10.4.4.7.3 (8th ed. 2012). 
6
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rescind within three business days. The courts have had a hard time 
resolving this conflict, and this Article will discuss their response to this 
challenge.26 
The courts have also been concerned with problems that arise when 
a creditor tries to induce the consumer into making a premature election 
not to rescind a transaction.27 In many cases, a creditor is simply trying 
to add finality to the transaction so that the three-day rescission period 
disappears, but it is not easy to reconcile the rescission language with an 
election not to cancel. It is confusing when the premature election 
indicates on the transaction date that the consumer’s right to rescind has 
already expired.28 The courts have been vigilant in preventing creditors 
from avoiding the stated procedure for a consumer to waive his right to 
rescind, and that is essentially what the premature election seeks to 
achieve.29 
This Article reveals that the uniformity sought by Congress through 
TILA has challenged the courts to clarify the relationship between a 
 
 26.  See Fuller v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. (In re Fuller), 642 F.3d 240, 243 (1st Cir. 
2011) (holding that creditor’s omission of specific deadline for rescission in creditor’s notice was 
not a violation even though coupled with wrong consummation date); Carye v. Long Beach Mortg. 
Co., 470 F.2d 3, 9 (D. Mass. 2007) (holding that the creditor’s notice about right to rescind was 
clear and conspicuous even though lacking transaction date and actual deadline for rescission); 
Barnes v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 825 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1071 (D. Or. 2011) (denying motion to 
dismiss when creditor gave wrong date for expiration of consumer’s right to rescind); Aubin v. 
Residential Funding Co., LLC, 565 F. Supp. 2d 392, 399 (D. Conn. 2008) (denying creditor’s 
motion to dismiss when creditor misstated the transaction date, and the rescission deadline and the 
notice of the right to rescind did not define the term “business day”); Ware v. Indymac Bank, FSB, 
534 F. Supp. 2d 835, 844 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (granting creditor’s motion to dismiss consumer’s claim 
even though the rescission deadline in the creditor’s notice had already passed). 
 27.  See Rand Corp. v. Yer Song Moua, 559 F.3d 842, 847 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that 
creditor violated statute by requiring consumers to sign statement that three business days had 
elapsed and consumers had not rescinded); Rodash v. AIB Mortg. Co., 16 F.3d 1142, 1146 (11th 
Cir. 1994) (holding that providing on the same day the notice of the right to cancel and the election 
not to cancel prevented the creditor’s clear disclosure of the consumer’s right to rescind); Conrad v. 
Farmers & Merchants Bank, 762 F. Supp. 2d 843, 847 (W.D. Va. 2011) (denying creditor’s motion 
to dismiss consumer’s claim of a violation relating to postdated confirmation that consumer had not 
rescinded); Wiggins v. Avco Fin. Servs., 62 F. Supp. 2d 90, 96 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding that election 
not to cancel constituted an impermissible waiver). 
 28.  See Rand Corp., 559 F.3d at 847 (observing that “[t]he [consumers] signed a statement 
on April 22, 2005, certifying it was April 26, 2005”). 
 29.  See Tenney v. Deutsche Bank Trust Corp., No. 08-40041-FDS, 2009 WL 415510, at *4-5 
(D. Mass. Jan. 6, 2009) (denying creditor’s motion to dismiss claim when creditor required 
consumer to sign confirmation at closing that three days had elapsed and that consumer had not 
rescinded transaction); Adams v. Nationscredit Fin. Servs. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d 829, 834 (N.D. 
Ill. 2004) (denying creditor’s claim for summary judgment when consumer had to sign confirmation 
at closing that he had elected not to rescind transaction and that three business days had elapsed 
since he received the notice of the right to cancel); Apaydin v. CitiBank Fed. Sav. Bank (In re 
Apaydin), 201 B.R. 716, 719 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (stating that use of waiver form had the effect 
of making disclosure less than clear and conspicuous). 
7
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notice of rescission and a suit for rescission, the relevance of the 
consumer’s ability to tender the loan principal, and the difficulty of 
recognizing a creditor’s attempt to accommodate a consumer’s 
premature election not to cancel a transaction. 
II. THE RIGHT OF RESCISSION 
A. A Question of Timing 
Nothing in the Truth in Lending scheme provokes as much 
discussion as the right of rescission.30 When a consumer grants a lender 
a security interest in his principal dwelling,31 the consumer has an 
absolute right to rescind the transaction within three business days after 
consummation of the transaction, delivery of all material disclosures, or 
delivery of the notice of the right to rescind, whichever happens last.32 If 
the creditor fails to make the proper disclosures, the right to rescind can 
last as long as three years.33 When the consumer in Beach v. Ocwen 
Federal Bank34 tried to use the right to rescind as a defense in 
recoupment against a collector after the three-year period had run, the 
United States Supreme Court left no doubt that the statute did not merely 
limit the time in which a consumer could bring an action, but governed 
the duration of the right itself.35 The consumer therefore had no right to 
rescind, defensively or otherwise, once the three-year period had 
expired.36 It is fair to say, therefore, that § 1635(f) of TILA is a statute of 
repose that imposes a three-year deadline on rescission actions.37 After 
 
 30.  With certain limited exceptions, a consumer has the right to rescind a credit transaction 
where a creditor has a security interest in the consumer’s principal dwelling. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) 
(2012); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(a)(1) (2014). 
 31.  Regulation Z defines “dwelling” as “a residential structure that contains one to four units, 
whether or not that structure is attached to real property.” 12 C.F.R. § 1026.2(a)(19) (2014). 
 32.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(a)(3). 
 33.  See id. § 1026.23(a)(3)(i); 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a). 
 34.  Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410 (1998). 
 35.  Id. at 417. The Court explained that § 1635(f) “talks not of a suit’s commencement but of 
a right’s duration, which it addresses in terms so straightforward as to render any limitation on the 
time for seeking a remedy superfluous.” Id. 
 36.  Id. at 419. 
 37.  See Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1187 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating that 
“[a]llowing uncertainty of title to drag on past the already-generous three-year repose period would 
run counter to the commercial-certainty concerns of Congress (recognized in Beach) that led 
Congress to establish the fixed and limited repose period of § 1635(f) in the first place”); Jones v. 
Saxon Mortg., Inc., 537 F.3d 320, 327 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that “[b]ecause § 1635(f) is a statute 
of repose, the time period stated therein is not tolled for any reason”); Miguel v. Country Funding 
Corp., 309 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that § 1635 is a statute of repose, depriving the 
courts of subject matter jurisdiction when a § 1635 claim is brought outside the three-year limitation 
period”); Harris v. OSI Fin. Servs., Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 885, 898 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (finding that § 
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss2/1
2015] CHALLENGES UNDER TRUTH IN LENDING 171 
Beach, the question still remained, however, about how a consumer 
could rescind a transaction. There is a difference between rescinding 
through notice alone and rescinding through judicial action. 
The consumer in Beach understandably tried to preserve his 
position by using his right of rescission defensively because it was too 
late for him to sue the lender.38 Section 1635(f) says nothing about 
bringing an action, and thus its language is not consistent with that 
usually found in a statute of limitations.39 The term “expire” makes its 
impact by extinguishing the underlying right to rescind once the three-
year period has expired. 
Regulation Z seems to make it quite easy for a consumer to rescind. 
All the consumer needs to do is “notify the creditor of the rescission by 
mail, telegram or other written means of communication.”40 It is the 
effect of the consumer’s notification that matters. There is no problem if 
the consumer rescinds within three business days because a consumer 
has a right to do so without giving any reason for his decision.41 If a 
consumer wants to rescind thereafter, he may find that the creditor is not 
impressed with his claim that the creditor has omitted some material 
disclosure42 or that it has not given the consumer a notice of the right to 
rescind.43 If the creditor disagrees with the consumer, there is a question 
 
1635(f) is a statute of repose and not subject to equitable extensions); Sobieniak v. BAC Home 
Loans Servicing, LP, 835 F. Supp. 2d 705, 710 (D. Minn. 2011) (stating that “TILA imposes a 
three-year statute of repose on claims for rescission”); Meyer v. Argent Mortg. Co. (In re Meyer), 
379 B.R. 529, 540 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007) (recognizing § 1635 as a statute of repose). 
 38.  The consumers in Beach conceded that they could not bring an independent action for 
rescission because the three-year period had run. However, they urged the Court to recognize their 
right of rescission as a defense in recoupment to the creditor’s collection action. See Beach, 523 
U.S. at 415. 
 39.  The Beach Court observed that “[t]he terms of a typical statute of limitation provide that 
a cause of action may or must be brought within a certain period of time.” Id. One must contrast this 
with the word “expire” used in § 1635(f). This was a signal to the Court that the statute deals with 
“duration” of a right rather than commencement of an action. See id. at 417. 
 40.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(a)(3)(i) (2014). 
 41.  See id. 
 42.  See Little v. Bank of Am., 769 F. Supp. 2d 954, 963 (E.D. Va. 2011) (holding that 
creditor complied with the material disclosure requirement of the payment schedule); Hubbard v. 
Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 624 F. Supp. 2d 913, 919 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (stating that creditor’s failure to 
disclose proper payment periods violated material disclosure provision); Hager v. Am. Gen. Fin., 
Inc., 37 F. Supp. 2d 778, 784-85 (S.D. W.Va. 1999) (denying summary judgment to creditor where 
consumer alleged creditor’s failure to include credit insurance premium in finance charge); Hopkins 
v. First NLC Fin. Servs., LLC (In re Hopkins), 372 B.R. 734, 743 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007) (stating 
that creditor’s failure to inform consumer that loan has variable interest is material and extends 
rescission period). Regulation Z defines “material disclosure” as “the required disclosures of the 
annual percentage rate, the finance charge, the amount financed, the total of payments, the payment 
schedule, and the disclosures and limitations referred to in §§ 1026.32(c) and (d) and 1026.43(g).” 
12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(a)(3)(ii). 
 43.  See Rand Corp. v. Yer Song Moua, 559 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that 
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whether the consumer’s mere notice to the creditor is enough to rescind 
the transaction, or whether the consumer must also sue for rescission 
within the statutory period. 
The conflict arises when a consumer gives a rescission notice to the 
creditor within the extended three-year period, but does not sue until 
after that period has passed. The courts have not agreed about whether a 
consumer must also sue within the three-year period, even if he has 
already given notice to the creditor.44 Some courts take the view that a 
consumer’s mere notice of rescission does not constitute a consumer’s 
exercise of the right to rescind. Under this theory, once the three-year 
period expires, a notice previously sent cannot extend the consumer’s 
time for actually bringing suit.45 Other courts make it possible for a 
consumer to extend the time for suit beyond three years because a 
consumer’s timely notice within the three-year period accomplishes 
 
creditor violated TILA by requiring consumer to sign statement indicating consumer’s election not 
to rescind transaction); Rodash v. AIB Mortg. Co., 16 F.3d 1142, 1146-47 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding 
that creditor violated statute by requiring consumer to sign form on the transaction date indicating 
election not to cancel); White v. Homefield Fin., Inc., 545 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1168 (W.D. Wash. 
2008) (denying assignee’s motion to strike where consumer argued that document had incorrect 
transaction date and did not contain expiration date); Adams v. Nationscredit Fin. Servs. Corp., 351 
F. Supp. 2d 829, 833-34 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (stating that creditor violated statute by requiring consumer 
to confirm at closing an election not to rescind transaction). 
 44.  See Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1185 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating that 
giving notice is a necessary act for the ultimate exercise of rescission, but that it is not sufficient); 
McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that 
rescission suit must be brought within three years regardless of when consumer gives notice); Jones 
v. Saxon Mortg., Inc., 537 F.3d 320, 327 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that “§ 1635(f) is an absolute time 
limit and cannot be tolled to allow a party to rescind after a foreclosure sale”); Sobieniak v. BAC 
Home Loan Servicing, LP, 835 F. Supp. 2d 705, 711 (D. Minn. 2011) (finding that allowing 
borrower’s rescission letter to toll the rescission period “contradicts Congress’s intent to create 
repose from the threat of rescission after three years”); Bradford v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., 799 F. 
Supp. 2d 625, 632 (E.D. Va. 2011) (holding that “the three-year time limit on TILA rescission is 
absolute, the expiration of which extinguishes the borrower’s rescission right regardless of whether 
any notice of rescission was filed within three years of closing”). But see Gilbert v. Residential 
Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 278 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating that “the three-year limitation . . . concerns 
the extinguishment of the right of rescission and does not require borrowers to file a claim for the 
invocation of that right”); Leonard v. Bank of Am. NA, No. 10-C-0814, 2012 WL 3001266, at *16 
(E.D. Wis. July 23, 2012) (finding that consumer exercised his right of rescission by sending written 
notice to creditor before the three year period expired); Herzog v. Countrywide Home Loans (In re 
Hunter), 400 B.R. 651, 662 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009) (concluding that “where the consumer timely 
elected to rescind the loan, § 1635(f) is not a limitation on the filing of suit to enforce that right”). 
 45.  See Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1188 (holding that “notice, by itself, is not sufficient to 
exercise (or preserve) a consumer’s right of rescission under TILA”); McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d 
at1328 (holding that “rescission suits must be brought within three years from the consummation of 
the loan, regardless of whether notice of rescission is delivered within that three-year period”); 
Sobieniak, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 710 (noting that a majority of courts hold that a claim for rescission 
does not survive the three-year period if a consumer sends a rescission request to the creditor but 
does not file suit until the period expires). 
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rescission.46 
In McOmie-Gray v. Bank of America Home Loans,47 the Ninth 
Circuit took the position that a consumer must file a lawsuit within three 
years after consummation of the loan.48 The court in McOmie-Gray did 
not treat the consumer’s notice as accomplishing the rescission that the 
consumer intended, but recognized it instead as merely advancing “a 
claim seeking rescission.”49 If the lender did not cooperate, then the 
consumer had to seek a judicial determination that his rescission was 
justified, and for that he had to act within three years.50 
The McOmie-Gray court relied on the Supreme Court’s statement 
in Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank that § 1635(f) “permits no federal right 
to rescind, defensively or otherwise, after the 3-year period of §1635(f) 
has run.”51 The Ninth Circuit in McOmie-Gray read Beach as governing 
cases where a consumer seeks rescission of a mortgage transaction.52 But 
the court did not rest on Beach alone; it relied on the approach that it had 
previously taken in Miguel v. Country Funding Corporation53 when the 
consumers did not notify the mortgagee of their rescission within three 
years.54 Unfortunately, they had sent a timely notice to the wrong party. 
The consumer in McOmie-Gray had given the lender timely notice 
of rescission, and the only question was whether she also had to bring 
suit within three years. On the other hand, the question in Miguel was 
whether the consumer had to give notice within three years, and not 
whether she had to sue.55 It was, therefore, a little surprising that the 
court in McOmie-Gray reminded the parties of the Miguel language 
 
 46.  See Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 2013); Gilbert, 678 
F.3d at 277; Herzog 400 B.R. at 662. 
 47.  McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1325. 
 48.  Id. at 1329. 
 49.  Id. at 1327 (quoting Large v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 292 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 
2002). 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 1328 (quoting Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 419 (1998)). 
 52.  The Beach Court recognized that § 1635(f) dealt with “a right’s duration” rather than “a 
suit’s commencement.” Beach, 523 U.S. at 417. The McOmie-Gray court interpreted the Beach 
language broadly to include the consumer’s suit for rescission. See McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 
1328. 
 53.  Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 54.  Id. at 1162. The borrowers sent their notice of rescission to the mortgage servicer on 
November 7, 1997, and then filed suit against the servicer on December 1, 1997, exactly three years 
from the closing date. When the borrowers realized that they had the wrong defendant, they 
amended their complaint after the three-year period had run to include the creditor. By then, it was 
too late. See id at 1162-63. 
 55.  See id. at 1165 (questioning whether the cancellation was effective even though the 
creditor did not receive it within the three-year period of repose); see also Phillippi v. Beneficial 
Loan & Thrift Co., No. 10-4281 (SRN/JJG), 2012 WL 684873, at *4 (D. Minn. March 2, 2012). 
11
Griffith: Challenges Under Truth in Ledning
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
174 AKRON LAW REVIEW [48:163 
stating that § 1635(f) barred any rescission claims brought more than 
three years after consummation.56 That language was mere dictum 
because a decision on the need for notice within three years did not 
require the court to answer the question whether the consumer had to sue 
within the same period. Nevertheless, the court in McOmie relied 
essentially on the dictum in Miguel that § 1635(f) represents an absolute 
bar on rescission actions that are filed more than three years after 
consummation.57 
The court in McOmie-Gray could have been more forthright in its 
opinion that the consumer had to file her suit within three years after 
consummation or be forever barred. The original version of the statute 
did not contain any time limit on rescission, so that a consumer who 
gave a notice of rescission that the creditor did not accept would be able 
to file suit in his own good time. It was not until 1974 that Congress 
amended the statute to set the three-year limit on the period for 
rescinding.58 That amendment seemed to send a message that left no 
doubt that the right to rescind would cease to exist after three years. 
In Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA,59 the Tenth Circuit allied itself 
with McOmie-Gray, emphasizing that “the mere invocation of the right 
to rescission via a written letter, without more is not enough to preserve 
a court’s ability to effectuate (or recognize) a rescission claim after the 
three-year period has run.”60 The court reminded the parties that 
rescission in its most basic form was an equitable remedy designed to 
restore the parties to the status quo ante.61 The court saw no material 
difference between the rescission remedy in Truth in Lending and that in 
the contractual context,62 contending that it is no more costly for the 
parties to rescind an agreement than to try to enforce it.63 But the court 
was concerned that a consumer’s mere notice of intent to rescind would 
not preserve that balance if the consumer decided much later to enforce 
 
 56.  The Court in McOmie-Gray recognized the Miguel holding that “the borrower’s right to 
rescission had expired because the bank did not receive a notice of rescission within three years 
from the consummation of the transaction.” McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1329 (citing Miguel, 309 
F.3d at 1165). The notice issue is different from that of the filing requirement. See Suits to Compel 
Rescission Brought More Than Three Years After Consummation, 43 CONSUMER CREDIT & TRUTH-
IN-LENDING COMPLIANCE REP., April 2012, at 3. 
 57.  McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1329 (citing Miguel, 309 F.3d at 1165). 
 58.  See Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1500, 1517 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (2012)). 
 59.  Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 60.  Id. at 1182. 
 61.  Id. at 1183-84. 
 62.  Id. at 1183. 
 63.  See id. at 1184 (citing Andrew Kull, Rescission and Restitution, 61 BUS. LAW. 569, 577 
(2006)). 
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rescission judicially in the face of an unresponsive creditor. After all, 
there could be a significant gap between the time the consumer notifies 
the creditor of rescission and the time  the consumer seeks a judicial 
remedy, when enforcement suddenly becomes more complicated and 
costly.64 
In Rosenfield, the consumer took refuge in the language of 
Regulation Z that directed her how to exercise her right to rescind. She 
suggested that mere notice to the creditor was all that the regulation 
required. The court agreed that notice was required, but concluded it was 
not sufficient.65 This seemed an adequate response to the consumer’s 
contention that neither TILA nor Regulation Z prescribed any 
requirement for rescission other than notice to the creditor. The court 
preferred to read the Truth in Lending language against the background 
of the statutory objective, thus putting some limitation on the right of 
rescission.66 The Rosenfield court went beyond McOmie-Gray to 
emphasize the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment in Beach that 
enlargement of the rescission period would effectively create 
commercial uncertainty.67 After all, it is in the best interests of creditors 
and consumers alike to have their transactions settled in some reasonable 
period of time, and categorizing the statute as one of repose furthers that 
objective. The Supreme Court recognized the different treatment given 
to recovery of damages and rescission in this context, especially since 
Congress allowed a consumer to assert a TILA violation as a matter of 
defense by recoupment in a creditor’s action to recover its debt even 
 
 64.  The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau urged the Tenth Circuit in Rosenfield to 
recognize the application of the one-year statute of limitations in § 1640 to the time period for 
bringing suit, relying on Herzog v. Countrywide Home Loans (In re Hunter), 400 B.R. 651, 660-61 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009) and Barnes v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 825 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1066 (D. Or. 
2011). Brief for Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-
Appellant, Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2012) (No. 3:10-CV-00063), 
2012 WL 1074082. But it must be noted that § 1640 only gives costs and an attorney’s fee to a 
consumer who brings a successful action confirming the consumer’s right of rescission under § 
1635. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (2012). It does not cover the period for bringing suit. 
 65.  See Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1185 (relying on the Beach concept of repose under TILA 
that would avoid commercial uncertainty and the extension of the period before the parties’ 
relationship is solidified). 
 66.  The Rosenfield court explained as follows: 
Accepting a consumer’s unilateral notice of an intent to rescind as a legally effective 
exercise of rescission, where the creditor has not in any sense actually acted on the 
consumer’s wishes, would indirectly enlarge the congressionally established three-year 
time period under TILA, and it could work to cloud the title of the property for an 
indefinite period of time. 
Id. at 1187. 
 67.  See id. at 1185. 
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though the one-year period had passed.68 As a result, the Court in Beach 
would not recognize a consumer’s right to rescind, “defensively or 
otherwise, after the 3-year period of § 1635(f) has run.”69 
It is understandable that the Rosenfield court was concerned about a 
possible extension beyond the statutory three-year period. The mere 
notification to a creditor would allow a consumer to sue later at his 
leisure without having to worry about the expiration of time, and this 
could create an uncertainty that might linger indefinitely.70 But this is 
certainly not a situation that is beyond a creditor’s control. If a creditor is 
skeptical about a consumer’s rescission claim, it can seek a judicial 
determination to resolve the matter.71 It is not as if the creditor is 
helpless in the face of the consumer’s action. Even if the creditor is not 
inclined to sue immediately, it may still raise questions with the 
consumer about the rescission claim and avoid any lingering uncertainty 
about the transaction. If the courts are concerned that a rescission dispute 
might last well beyond the three-year period if a rescission notice within 
that period is enough to preserve the consumer’s claim, it is enough to 
say that the creditor has an incentive to act promptly itself if it senses 
that it is being disadvantaged by the consumer’s lethargic approach to 
judicial action. Any uncertainty about the transaction or any perceived 
cloud on title can last only as long as a lender is willing to remain silent 
in the face of the consumer’s rescission notice.72 
When the Fourth Circuit in Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC73 
expressed the contrary view, that a borrower need only express his 
rescission through a written notice within the three-year period, it relied 
essentially on the plain meaning rule of statutory construction to 
conclude that both the statute and the regulation deal only with the 
 
 68.  Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 419 (1998). 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  See Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1187 n.11 (recognizing that if a consumer’s notice to the 
creditor is sufficient to preserve the right of rescission, a consumer can sit on her rights and seek 
enforcement some years into the future). 
 71.  See Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 734 (8th Cir. 2013) (Murphy J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that a lender may choose to negotiate or litigate 
when the consumer notifies it of rescission, but there can be no indefinite cloud on title without the 
lender’s tacit consent); Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 266-67 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(stating that a lender can resolve any uncertainty by suing to confirm the invalidity of the 
consumer’s rescission, or in the alternative the lender can do nothing and assume that a court will 
recognize the rescission as valid). 
 72.  See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING, supra note 25, § 10.6.3.1.3 
(stating that creditor can file suit challenging validity of rescission). Regulation Z contemplates that 
the creditor has twenty days to act on the consumer’s notice of rescission. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(d)(2) 
(2014). By the same token, a creditor can use that same time to let the consumer know that it 
questions the consumer’s right to rescind. 
 73.  Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2012). 
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consumer’s right to rescind.74 The borrower exercised that right by letter 
well within the three-year period, and neither the statute nor the 
regulation said anything about filing a lawsuit.75 The court differentiated 
between exercising a right to rescind and completing the rescission.76 
The Fourth Circuit in Gilbert suggested that once borrowers give notice 
of rescission, they are protected even if the lender resists the rescission 
and forces the borrowers to take further enforcement steps. As far as the 
Fourth Circuit was concerned, the basic issue was whether the borrowers 
had exercised their right of rescission in time, and the lender’s lack of 
cooperation did not affect that determination.77 
Like other courts, the Gilbert court took its turn at explaining 
Beach, emphasizing that the Supreme Court did not deal with the timely 
exercise of the borrower’s right to rescind, but rather with the question 
whether § 1635(f) was a statute of limitation or a statute of repose.78 The 
Court in Beach did not allow the defendant to assert rescission as an 
affirmative defense beyond the three-year period because there was then 
no existing right—it had vanished, it had expired.79 It is true that in 
Beach there was no rescission letter, but the basic question remained 
 
 74.  Id. at 276-77 (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989)). 
One authority has explained the plain meaning rule this way: “In the absence of a specific indication 
to the contrary, words used in the statute will be given their common, ordinary and accepted 
meaning, and the plain language of the statute should be afforded its plain meaning.” 2A NORMAN J. 
SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:1 (7th ed. 
2012). 
 75.  According to the Gilbert court, all that a consumer has to do in order to exercise his right 
to rescind is to give the creditor the proper notice prescribed by Regulation Z. Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 
277 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(a)(2)). 
 76.  Id. Under this interpretation, the exercise of the right of rescission is a preliminary act 
that merely gives the creditor notice about the consumer’s intentions. See Bradford v. HSBC Mortg. 
Corp., 838 F. Supp. 2d 424, 434 (E.D. Va. 2012) (finding that consumer does not exercise right to 
rescind merely by giving notice of intent to rescind). If the creditor does not respond to the 
consumer’s initiative, the question still remains whether the consumer can then wait until he decides 
to press a rescission claim in court, however long that decision takes. 
 77.  See Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 277. 
 78.  See id. at 278. 
 79.  See Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 417 (1988). It seems that the Court wanted 
to avoid the expansion of time that might affect the uncertainty of title. If the consumer’s unilateral 
notice to the creditor accomplishes rescission, but the creditor does not respond, it means therefore 
that the consumer may take his time in seeking judicial enforcement of the rescission remedy. This 
is not what the Beach Court had in mind. See id. at 415-16. If the consumer’s unilateral notice had 
this effect, then this would suggest that such notice would automatically void a loan contract; most 
courts do not support that proposition because a consumer could avoid his obligations simply by 
sending notices of rescission to the creditor. See Am. Mortg. Network, Inc. v. Shelton, 486 F.3d 
815, 821 (4th Cir. 2007) (adopting majority view that “unilateral notification of cancellation does 
not automatically void the loan contract”); Yamamoto v. Bank of N.Y., 329 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (finding that in contested case, rescission is accomplished when a court finds in the 
consumer’s favor); Large v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 292 F.3d 49, 54-55 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(observing that mere assertion of right to rescind does not automatically void the contract). 
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whether the defendant had acted in time, and the conclusion was that he 
was too late. 
When the Third Circuit in Sherzer v. Homestar Mortgage Services80 
joined the Fourth Circuit in Gilbert in holding that a consumer’s valid 
rescission notice was enough to rescind a transaction under TILA, a 
clear split emerged between those courts and the Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits on the other side. The Sherzer court viewed Beach simply as 
requiring a consumer to exercise his right of rescission within three 
years, but not indicating how a consumer should exercise that right.81 
This was consistent with the approach in Beach because the consumers 
in that case did not indicate any interest in rescinding until the three-year 
period had expired. Therefore, there was no problem in trying to 
interpret any action that the consumer may have taken before that 
expiration. 
When the Eighth Circuit joined the fray in Keiran v. Home Capital, 
Inc.,82 it cast its lot with the Ninth Circuit in McOmie-Gray and the 
Tenth Circuit in Rosenfield. The Keiran court seemed convinced that a 
statute of repose is always associated with filing a lawsuit.83 
Nevertheless, there is nothing in the nature of a statute of repose that 
always requires a consumer to seek a judicial remedy. It depends on the 
context.84 A statute of repose can force a person to act before a certain 
deadline, but the particular context may dictate something short of 
judicial action.85 In the TILA context, a consumer must take some action 
to rescind within a certain period, lest the statutory right be extinguished. 
Both TILA and Regulation Z confirm that the consumer takes the 
necessary action by notifying the creditor of his decision to rescind.86 It 
is not as if Congress does not know how to make a lawsuit a requirement 
 
 80.  Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d. 255 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 81.  See id. at 258. 
 82.  Keiran v. Home Capital Inc., 720 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 83.  The Eighth Circuit agreed with the Rosenfield court that a consumer seeking rescission 
must file suit, instead of merely giving notice, within three years in order to prevail under § 1635(f). 
See id. at 728. 
 84.  See McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(finding that § 1635 does not explicitly establish a time limit in which a consumer must file suit to 
rescind). Statutes of repose that require that an action be filed typically refer to the commencement 
of a civil action. Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 259. A statute of repose does not always set a time limit for a 
lawsuit because it all depends on how a consumer may exercise his rights under a particular statute. 
See Keiran, 720 F.3d at732 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 85.  See Ma v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 597 F.3d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(finding that under a statute of repose the bank did not have to reimburse its customer for an 
unauthorized transfer if the customer did not object within one year); Balam-Chuc v. Mukasey, 547 
F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding 8 U.S.C. § 245(i) to be a statute of repose which required 
aliens to file a visa petition on or before April 30, 2001, in order to qualify for adjustment of status). 
 86.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(a)(2) (2014). 
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for a consumer to exercise a statutory right under a statute of repose. 
Congress has certainly risen to the challenge in other contexts where it 
prohibited judicial action after a certain time.87 The majority in Keiran 
recognized a consumer’s written notice to the creditor as one of the 
requirements for rescinding, but not the only one.88 In the majority’s 
view, a consumer has to follow up with a lawsuit within three years if he 
wants to complete the process.89 But if neither TILA nor Regulation Z 
says anything about a lawsuit, it is not clear why the majority thought it 
necessary to make this a requirement even if litigation might ensue from 
the creditor’s failure to accept the consumer’s rescission. If the 
consumer rescinds and the cooperative creditor fulfills its responsibilities 
by returning the consumer’s property and taking any necessary action to 
terminate its security interest, there would be no place for a lawsuit in 
the scheme of things.90 Where the parties have acted in furtherance of 
the consumer’s rescission, it can hardly be said, therefore, that they must 
nevertheless conjure up some kind of judicial action to put the final seal 
of approval on the parties’ implementation of that rescission.91 Even if a 
suit is sometimes necessary because the creditor does not agree that the 
consumer has a right to rescind, that does not mean the consumer has not 
rescinded. In that event, the creditor will seek judicial intervention to 
settle the matter one way or the other, but that does not affect the reality 
that the consumer has complied with the requirements for rescission. 
 
 87.  See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363 (1991) 
(recognizing statute of repose which provided that no action could be maintained under the 
Securities Act of 1933 to enforce liability unless brought within three years after the violation); 
Radford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 151 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (recognizing 29 
U.S.C. § 1113 as statute of repose which foreclosed any action brought more than six years after the 
breach of a fiduciary duty). 
 88.  See Keiran, 720 F.3d at 728; see also Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 
1185 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating that “the giving of notice is a necessary predicate to the ultimate 
exercise of the [rescission] right”). The Rosenfield court interpreted 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(a)(2) as 
imposing a duty on the consumer to notify the creditor of his rescission in order to exercise the right 
to rescind later. See id. at 1185. 
 89.  Keiran, 720 F.3d at 728. 
 90.  See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(d) (effects of rescission). 
 91.  Regulation Z does allow for judicial intervention relating to the parties’ return of money 
or property involved in the transaction. See id. § 1026.23(d)(4). But this is a far cry from requiring 
judicial action for rescission to occur. See Sherzer v. v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 260 
(3d Cir. 2013). Although the Act provides for a statute of limitations governing damages, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1640(e), there is no similar provision relating to rescission. Instead, the Act provides that “the 
obligor shall have the right to rescind the transaction . . . by notifying the creditor, in accordance 
with the regulations of the Bureau, of his intention to do so.” 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a). There is nothing 
in the statute about filing a lawsuit. This raises a question about the requirement for court action if 
Congress did not deem it necessary to include appropriate language in the statute. See Hartman v. 
Smith, 734 F.3d 752, 762 (8th Cir. 2013) (Melloy, J., concurring); Gilbert v. Residential Funding 
LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 277 (4th Cir. 2012). 
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B. The Basis for Disagreement 
The framework for exploring this judicial split lies in § 1635.92 
Subsection (a) allows a consumer to exercise the right of rescission by 
notifying the creditor of his intention to do so in accordance with 
Regulation Z.93 Subsection (f) then provides that the consumer’s right of 
rescission “shall expire three years after the date of consummation of the 
transaction or upon the sale of the property . . . .”94 Regulation Z 
provides that the consumer may exercise the right of rescission by 
notifying the creditor by “mail, telegram or other means of written 
communication.”95 
If a court recognizes a consumer’s timely notice as the time of 
rescission, then it should not matter what happens after the expiration of 
the three-year period. A consumer would not sue later to exercise his 
right of rescission, but rather to confirm the rescission if the creditor is 
uncooperative.96 The plain language approach to the statute and the 
regulation suggests that it is the consumer’s notice that produces the 
rescission.97 If the creditor has no problems with the consumer’s 
rescission notice, then the creditor and the consumer should follow the 
procedures outlined in the regulation.98 The parties’ obligations ensue 
from the consumer’s rescission, and that rescission occurs when the 
consumer sends the appropriate notice to the creditor.99 There is nothing 
 
 92.  15 U.S.C. § 1635. 
 93.  Id. § 1635(a). 
 94.  Id. § 1635(f). 
 95.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(a)(2). 
 96.  The Fourth Circuit pointed out the difference between exercising a right to rescind and 
completing the rescission. The parties must either “unwind the transaction among themselves, or the 
borrower must file a lawsuit so that the court may enforce the right to rescind.” Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 
277. The Third Circuit found that rescission occurs when the consumer sends a valid notice of 
rescission. Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 261 n.5. Both courts agreed, however, that a consumer could still 
sue after the three-year period has expired. See id. at 267; Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 278. 
 97.  The Gilbert court refused to impose a filing requirement on the provision for rescission. 
See Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 277. Neither the statute nor the regulation says anything about filing a 
lawsuit. See id. In plain terms Regulation Z requires a consumer to notify the creditor if he wants to 
exercise the right to rescind. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(a)(2). The consumer’s notice informs the creditor 
that the consumer is rescinding. Id. There is no prediction at that point about how the creditor will 
react to the consumer’s notice, and the consumer may have to bring a lawsuit to accomplish this 
objective. But the regulation addresses the consumer’s exercise of the right to rescind, and the 
regulatory language should be given its plain meaning. See SINGER & SHAMBIE, supra note 74, at 
§46:1. 
 98.  See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(d)(2)-(3). The creditor must return the consumer’s money within 
twenty days, and then the consumer must return the creditor’s money. 
 99.  If the consumer exercises his right to rescind according to § 1026.23(a), then § 
1026.23(d) outlines the effects of that rescission. There can be no effect of rescission if no 
rescission has occurred. Subsection (d) begins with “[w]hen a consumer rescinds,” a sure clue that 
rescission has taken place. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(d)(1). This reference to a consumer’s act of 
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in the statute or the regulation suggesting that a court must intervene for 
rescission to occur. For all intents and purposes, rescission is a private 
affair that the parties can work out between themselves. A consumer has 
the unfettered right to rescind within three days, and no judicial 
intervention is necessary for the consumer to exercise that right. 
Congress must have been confident about the parties’ ability to 
accomplish rescission on their own because it even expanded the time 
for a creditor to return a consumer’s money.100 This accommodation is 
consistent with the idea that a creditor should have enough time to react 
to the consumer’s rescission and to decide on its own course of action 
once the consumer has shown his hand. If the parties disagree, litigation 
may ensue, but by then rescission would have already occurred. If a 
court finds that the consumer’s rescission is valid, then it will follow the 
procedures outlined in the regulation and confirm the rescission. 
It is not necessary to tie the time for rescinding a transaction to the 
time for enforcing rescission. The statute provides a three-year limit on 
the right of rescission. If the consumer’s notice is not enough by itself to 
bring about rescission, a consumer will have to give notice with enough 
time to spare, so that he will be able to file suit against the lender if the 
lender does not respond to the consumer’s notice within twenty days.101 
This means, therefore, that a consumer will not have a full three years to 
rescind through notice. The consumer may run out of time to work out 
the rescission details with the lender if the only thing that counts is the 
lawsuit.102 One can only imagine that a lender will not have much 
 
rescinding is far different from a court’s intervention to accomplish rescission and gives additional 
weight to the idea that the consumer’s valid notice is the defining moment. See Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 
259 n.2. When this regulatory reference is considered with § 1635, it confirms that the consumer’s 
written notice brings about rescission, because it is the consumer’s right of rescission that expires in 
§ 1635(f) and there is nothing there that implicates the commencement of a lawsuit. See id. at 259-
60; Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 278. 
 100.  In 1980 Congress increased the creditor’s time for returning the consumer’s money or 
property from ten days to twenty days thus, in effect, giving the creditor even more time to 
determine the validity of the consumer’s rescission. See S. REP. NO. 96-368, at 29 (1980), as 
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 234, 264. 
 101.  A consumer must be wary of sending his rescission notice too close to the expiration of 
the three-year period if that notice is not enough to accomplish rescission. The creditor has twenty 
days to respond by returning the consumer’s money or property and taking any action to terminate 
the security interest. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(d)(2). If the notice is not enough for rescission to 
occur, then a creditor has a strategic advantage if the consumer gives notice within twenty days of 
the expiration of the three-year period. All the creditor has to do is bide its time, wait for the twenty 
days to expire, and then it will be too late for the consumer to sue. The drafters could hardly have 
intended that result. 
 102.  As a matter of principle, the consumer should have a full three years to exercise his right 
to rescind. The right mentioned in § 1635(f) of TILA (dealing with expiration) is the same right 
covered in § 1026.23(a)(2) (dealing with the exercise of the right to rescind). Nowhere does the 
statute or regulation suggest that the consumer must remember to provide for the creditor’s twenty 
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incentive to cooperate with a consumer if the latter gives his rescission 
notice near the end of the three-year period, for then the lender may just 
wait for the time to expire without reacting to the consumer’s notice.103 
A consumer’s bona fide rescission may be rendered ineffective because 
the consumer did not rush to litigation in time. This seems counter to the 
proposition that rescission is a private process that allows the parties to 
return to the status quo ante. Any ensuing litigation that arises because 
of the parties’ disagreement is intended to address the creditor’s concern 
about the validity of the consumer’s rescission.104 However, if notice is 
not sufficient, one wonders whether this gives a creditor a strategic 
advantage in delaying its response when the consumer gives notice 
shortly before the three-year period expires.105 It may also give a creditor 
the incentive to prolong negotiations even when a consumer gives early 
notice. It is conceivable that such a strategy can take the parties to the 
brink of the rescission period, leaving the consumer little time to file 
suit. 
In McOmie-Gray, the consumer saw what can happen when 
negotiations over rescission continue for over a year and then the 
consumer files her lawsuit.106 Even in the face of the consumer’s 
allegation that the bank had decided to toll the statute of limitations, the 
Ninth Circuit still found that the consumer had failed to meet her 
deadline for filing suit.107 The delay in McOmie-Gray certainly inured to 
the lender’s benefit, and it was in the lender’s interest to extend the time 
 
days to respond, thus cutting down on what seems to be an absolute period of three years for the 
consumer to rescind. If the consumer rescinds within three days instead of during the extended 
three-year period, there is no doubt that the consumer can enforce a valid rescission notice even 
after the three days have expired. See Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 264. 
 103.  It is understood that “section 1635 is written with the goal of making the rescission 
process a private one, worked out between creditor and debtor without the intervention of the 
courts.” Belini v. Washington Mut. Bank, FA, 412 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 2005). Allowing a creditor 
to plan strategically to wait out the rescission period when the consumer gives notice near the end of 
the three years would interrupt the smooth working of the rescission process and provide an 
incentive for a consumer to sue sooner rather than later. See Brief for Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants, Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. 
Servs., 707 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 11-4254), 2012 WL 1408760, at *20. 
 104.  See Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 261 n.4; Peterson v. Highland Music Inc., 140 F.3d 1313, 1322 
(9th Cir. 1998). 
 105.  In McOmie-Gray, the transaction closed on April 14, 2006, but the consumer did not send 
her rescission letter until January 18, 2008. McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 
1325 (9th Cir. 2012). The lender initially refused to accept her notice of rescission, but then 
negotiated with her about the rescission for more than a year, while supposedly agreeing to toll the 
statute of limitations relating to her rescission until August 30, 2009. Id. at 1327. The court held that 
the consumer’s right to rescind expired on April 14, 2009, and that the parties’ tolling agreement 
was irrelevant. Id. at 1329-30. The lender had everything to gain by negotiating as long as possible. 
 106.  See id. at 1327. 
 107.  Id. at 1329-30. 
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as much as possible. Setting the time of notice as the proper limit for 
rescission removes any incentive for a creditor to use dilatory tactics in 
the rescission process. 
In light of the possible disagreement about the consumer’s right to 
rescind, one would expect a consumer to be circumspect about his 
rescission message. When the consumers in U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. 
Manzo tried to use their right of rescission as a bargaining chip, they 
found out they had missed the three-year deadline by one day after 
sending four letters to the lender in an attempt to negotiate a settlement 
to a foreclosure action.108 The consumers wanted to entice the lender 
into a loan modification but were keen to point out that if litigation 
ensued, they could assert certain defenses and counterclaims arising out 
of Truth in Lending violations.109 The consumers’ last letter to the lender 
included with it a proposed counterclaim for rescission and damages.110 
The consumers left no doubt about what they had in mind. The proposed 
counterclaim contained the following language: “‘[t]he borrowers, by 
the filing of this action, elect to rescind the subject transaction.’”111 
Although a court granted the consumers permission to file their 
counterclaim on March 11, 2008, the consumers did not file it until 
November 19, 2008, more than three years after consummation of the 
loan transaction.112 
The consumers certainly made a valiant effort to impress the lender 
with the possibility of rescinding the transaction if they could not reach a 
modification agreement, but the four letters to the lender were simply a 
part of the settlement negotiations between the parties. The letters were 
certainly conditional in nature and assured the lender that the consumers 
could assert certain defenses if they had to litigate.113 Even the proposed 
counterclaim that the consumers sent to the lender for review did not 
indicate any present intention to rescind, because it was only a proposal. 
The proposed counterclaim therefore sent a message that the consumers 
intended to rescind the transaction by filing their counterclaim and not 
by any other method.114 But the court made so much of the consumers’ 
 
 108.  U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Manzo, 960 N.E. 2d 1238 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
 109.  See id. at 1241. 
 110.  Id. at 1242. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. at 1243. 
 113.  Id. at 1241 (emphasis added). 
 114.  The consumers had included the proposed counterclaim with their fourth letter to the 
lender on December 14, 2007. On March 11, 2008, they filed a motion for leave to file their 
counterclaim. Id. at 1242-43. The consumers did not actually file the counterclaim until November 
19, 2008, exactly three years and one day after the loan transaction was consummated. They were 
one day too late. See id. at 1248-49. 
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lack of intent to rescind, that it seemed willing to concede that the 
consumers could have achieved their objective by timely notice.115 This 
approach seemed consistent with cases where the mere rescission notice 
was sufficient to vindicate the consumer’s claim.116 It only goes to show 
that a consumer must leave no doubt about his rescission, and conduct 
that can be interpreted as a declaration of intent will do the consumer no 
good in the face of an uncooperative creditor. The consumer’s notice to 
the creditor must be unequivocal. 
C. Impact of Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank 
The disagreement among the courts about the effect of the time 
limit on the consumer’s right to rescind rests essentially on the courts’ 
interpretation of Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank. In Beach, the consumers 
did not assert their right of rescission within three years, but tried to do 
so thereafter as an affirmative defense in foreclosure.117 The consumers 
were confident about their position because they viewed § 1635(f) as a 
statute of limitations that governed the filing of a lawsuit rather than the 
use of rescission as a defense.118 The Supreme Court did not side with 
the consumers because it held that the right of rescission itself lasts only 
three years.119 Once that period passed, the consumers in Beach had 
nothing to assert: the right to rescind had expired. 
It is noteworthy, however, that the Supreme Court did not say 
anything about how a consumer could exercise his right to rescind, and 
that is the question that has divided the courts in the post-Beach era.120 It 
 
 115.  The court acknowledged Regulation Z’s flexibility about the type of written 
communication that a consumer can use to rescind a transaction. Id. at 1247. But the court looked 
for evidence that the consumers had communicated their present intent to rescind. See id. 
 116.  See Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 277 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating that 
consumer exercised right of rescission in timely fashion by sending notice to lender within three-
year period); Jackson v. CIT Grp./Consumer Fin., Inc., No. 2:06-CV 543, 2006 WL 3098767, at *2 
(W.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2006) (holding that consumer’s rescission notice was timely when sent within 
three years); Herzog v. Countrywide Home Loans (In re Hunter), 400 B.R. 651, 662 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 2009) (denying lender’s motion to dismiss since consumer gave timely notice within three-year 
period). 
 117.  See Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 411-12 (1998). 
 118.  See id. at 415. 
 119.  The Court stated the general rule: “[A] defendant’s right to plead ‘recoupment’ . . . 
survives the expiration of the period provided by a statute of limitation that would otherwise bar the 
recoupment claim as an independent cause of action.” Id. The only problem was that § 1635(f) was 
not a statute of limitation and therefore did not fall within the general rule. See id. at 417. 
 120.  Compare Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Neither 
§1635(a) nor Regulation Z states that the obligor must also file suit; both refer exclusively to written 
notification as the means by which an obligor exercises his right of rescission.”), with Rosenfield v. 
HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1183 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that “the mere invocation of the 
right to rescission via a written letter, without more is not enough to preserve a court’s ability to 
22
Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss2/1
2015] CHALLENGES UNDER TRUTH IN LENDING 185 
is understandable that the Court was silent on that issue because the 
consumers in Beach did not take any steps to rescind their loan before 
the lender began foreclosure proceedings following the three-year 
period.121 It did not matter, therefore, how the consumers exercised their 
right to rescind, whether through suit or by asserting it as a defense. The 
three-year period had already expired and the consumers could not do 
anything thereafter to resurrect that right. If the notice is the thing that 
matters as far as rescission goes, any suit after the three-year period 
expires would be for vindication of the consumers’ rights to recover 
their money and to settle any questions about liens on their property.122 
In Beach, the Supreme Court viewed § 1635(f) as a statute that 
extinguished the consumers’ right of rescission after three years.123 That 
time period runs from the date of the transaction’s consummation, rather 
than from the time of the consumers’ awareness that the lender did not 
give the proper disclosures, a factor unique to a statute of limitations.124 
This does not mean, however, that a consumer must file a lawsuit 
within three years simply because § 1635(f) is a statute of repose. Such a 
statute extinguishes a statutory right unless the consumer acts within a 
certain period to exercise that right. But it is not always necessary for a 
right to be exercised through litigation. It all depends on the type of 
statute involved, and there is nothing unusual about exercising a 
statutory right short of litigation. Of course, litigation is usually 
available to vindicate a consumer’s rights when the parties disagree. 
However, in the Truth in Lending context, it is the consumer’s notice to 
the creditor that carries the rescission message.125 There is little evidence 
 
effectuate or recognize a rescission claim after the three-year period has run”). 
 121.  The loan transaction closed in 1986, and the consumers tried to rescind in 1991, more 
than three years later. See Beach, 523 U.S. at 415. The Beach Court therefore did not have to say 
anything about how the consumers could rescind because there was no existing right to do so. See 
id. at 417. 
 122.  Section 1635(a) is in the nature of rescission at law, and any subsequent action is for 
enforcement of the consumer’s rights. See Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 261 n.4.; Gilbert v. Residential 
Funding L.L.C., 678 F.3d at 271, 277 (4th Cir. 2012); NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., TRUTH IN 
LENDING, supra note 25, § 12.2.2.4.2. 
 123.  Although the Court in Beach did not mention the term “repose,” the courts nevertheless 
have generally treated the decision as recognizing § 1635(f) as a statute of repose. See Rosenfield, 
681 F.3d at 1182; McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 
2012); Jones v. Saxon Mortg., Inc., 537 F.3d 320, 327 (4th Cir. 1998); Phillippi v. Beneficial Loan 
& Thrift Co., No. 10-4281 (SRN/JJG), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27799, at *11 (D. Minn. March 2, 
2012); Dixon v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1334 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
 124.  See Beach, 523 U.S. at 417 (explaining that § 1635(f) deals with the duration of the 
rescission right itself, instead of merely barring the remedy). 
 125.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2012) (indicating that “the obligor shall have the right to 
rescind the transaction . . . by notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations of the Bureau, 
of his intention to do so”); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(a)(2) (2014) (indicating that the obligor must notify 
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that Congress intended that such notice should be ignored in favor of a 
later exercise of the rescission right through litigation.126 The language 
seems clear enough that a consumer’s notice has a certain effect, and it 
leaves one wondering why some courts ignore the plain language about 
how a consumer may rescind. The limitation period addresses a 
consumer’s right to rescind, but if a consumer has already exercised that 
right when the three-year period expires, a subsequent lawsuit to enforce 
a consumer’s rights will ensue only if the creditor ignores the 
consumer’s notice or otherwise fails to honor its statutory obligations. It 
is then up to the consumer to enforce the rescission, and this does not 
leave the lender in a conundrum if the consumer fails to act promptly in 
vindicating his statutory rights. 
Although § 1635 does not specifically set a time limit for litigation, 
at least § 1640 should be recognized as requiring a consumer to sue 
within one year after the creditor fails to respond to the consumer’s 
notice.127 After all, § 1640(e) does cover any action brought under § 
1640, and § 1640(a)(3) makes specific reference to a consumer’s right to 
recover costs and a reasonable attorney’s fee in a successful action for 
rescission.128 Section 1640(a)(3) seems to refer to two possible actions: 
one possibility being a lawsuit to enforce a creditor’s liability for failing 
to comply with any requirement relating to credit transactions, and the 
other relating to a determination that the consumer has a right to rescind. 
When § 1640(e) refers to “any action under this section,” it is possible to 
include within that terminology not only an action for damages, but also 
one in which a court upholds a consumer’s right to rescind.129 It is true 
 
his lender “by mail, telegram, or other means of written communication”). 
 126.  See McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1327 (“Section 1635 does not explicitly establish a time 
limit in which borrowers must bring suit for rescission if a lender does not comply with the 
rescission request.”); Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 259 (finding that § 1635(b) requires a creditor to return 
the consumer’s money or property within twenty days after receipt of a notice of rescission, not 
within twenty days of a court order). 
 127.  See Barnes v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 825 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1065 (D. Or. 2011) (stating 
that § 1635(f) should be interpreted to limit the consumer’s exercise of the right to rescind rather 
than the time in which the consumer can sue to enforce that right); Herzog v. Countrywide Home 
Loans (In re Hunter), 400 B.R. 651, 662 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009) (stating that if a creditor fails to 
respond to the consumer’s timely rescission, the consumer should have a year to sue). In Miguel, the 
court denied relief to a consumer because her cancellation notice did not reach the creditor within 
the three-year period. Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2002). The 
court also observed that the borrower had one year from the creditor’s refusal of cancellation to file 
suit. Id. That did not help the consumer in Miguel because the three-year period for cancellation had 
already passed when the consumer gave notice. See id. 
 128.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1640(a)(3), 1640(e) (2012). 
 129.  There is some legislative support for the idea that Congress intended to apply the one-
year statute of limitations to an enforcement action for rescission. The Senate Report relating to the 
amendment of TILA by the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 
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that in McOmie-Gray the court viewed § 1640(e) as providing for 
damages because of a lender’s statutory violation, and the court was 
concerned that the section made no mention of rescission.130 In the Ninth 
Circuit’s view, therefore, the one-year limitation was not relevant to an 
action for rescission.131 But the court should have observed that § 
1640(e) does not say anything about damages either and merely 
addresses an action brought under § 1640.132 This should include an 
action for rescission under subsection (a)(3) which, if successful, would 
produce costs and a reasonable attorney’s fee. 
In Beach, the consumers made no attempt to rescind within the 
statutory three-year period, but nevertheless tried to save the day by 
using rescission as a defense in foreclosure proceedings.133 It was not 
until then that the lender realized there was something amiss with the 
Truth in Lending disclosures. Had the consumers been diligent in giving 
the proper notice to the lender before the right of rescission had expired, 
the lender would have been keenly aware of the risk it was taking in 
ignoring the consumers. After all, as a secured party, the lender would 
have been concerned about its lien on the consumers’ property. On the 
other hand, a consumer’s rescission defense in foreclosure proceedings 
may come well after the three-year period prescribed in § 1635, possibly 
leading to the uncertainty of title and the ultimate loss of the lender’s 
security interest. 
There is an advantage, therefore, in recognizing a consumer’s 
notice as a defining moment in the rescission process because it makes 
the lender fully aware of the consumer’s position in good time.134 If the 
 
tit. 6, 94 Stat. 168 (1980), indicated: “The bill . . . makes it explicit that a consumer may institute 
suit under section 130 to enforce the right of rescission and recover costs and attorney’s fees in a 
successful action.” S. REP. NO. 96-368, at 32 (1979), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 268. 
The language in § 1640(a)(3) seems to reflect the intent of the congressional report that a consumer 
who prevails in a rescission action should get costs and a reasonable attorney’s fee. See 15 U.S.C. § 
1640(a)(3). 
 130.  See McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 131.  See id. at 1329-30. 
 132.  Section 1640(e) begins with the following phrase: “[a]ny action under this section.” 15 
U.S.C. § 1640(e). The reference to “this section” relates to § 1640, and subsection (a)(3) specifically 
covers any action covering rescission. That is the connection that substantiates the application of the 
one-year rule. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING, supra note 25, § 12.2.2.4.2. 
 133.  See Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 411 (1998). 
 134.  If the consumer rescinds by giving notice to the lender, the lender may then initiate 
litigation if it does not agree that the consumer has any such right. On the other hand, the consumer 
himself may sue if the lender does not respond within twenty days. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2012); 
12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(d)(2) (2014). Neither party is particularly disadvantaged by treating the 
consumer’s notice as the defining moment. A consumer does not have to sue for his rescission to be 
recognized. This is where the Tenth Circuit in Rosenfield, took a different view of the rescission 
remedy, when contrasted with that of the Third Circuit in Sherzer v. Homestar Mortgage Servs., 707 
25
Griffith: Challenges Under Truth in Ledning
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
188 AKRON LAW REVIEW [48:163 
lender does not agree with the rescission, it can then sue. But the 
lender’s silence will also give the consumer the same opportunity to sue, 
and this should not prolong the matter too much once the consumer has 
given the proper notice within the three-year period. This is precisely 
what § 1635(f) was intended to do: create an opportunity for the 
consumer to rescind while he still has the right to do so. As a statute of 
repose, § 1635 does not allow a consumer to go beyond the prescribed 
time before rescinding, and Regulation Z indicates that a consumer must 
give notice to achieve that objective.135 It says nothing about bringing a 
lawsuit. 
This approach is consistent with a consumer’s absolute right to 
rescind within three days following consummation of the transaction, 
delivery of the notice of the right to rescind, or delivery of the material 
disclosures, whichever happens last.136 If the consumer exercises his 
right within the statutory period and the creditor does not respond, the 
consumer can nevertheless bring suit even though the three-day period 
has expired.137 It is not arguable that the consumer must give his 
rescission notice and also sue within three days. When a consumer 
rescinds within the three-day period, a creditor has twenty days to react 
to the consumer’s notice.138 One would hardly expect a consumer to 
have the three-day rescission period shortened by inserting some 
additional requirement of a suit within that period. It is questionable 
whether the right of rescission relating to the three-year period should be 
subject to different rules when neither the statute nor the regulation 
 
F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2013) and the Fourth Circuit in Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271 
(4th Cir. 2012). The Rosenfield court believed that judicial action was necessary if a consumer 
wanted to invoke his right to rescind. See Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1183 
(10th Cir. 2012). It is noteworthy, however, that the court refrained from expressing its view on 
whether rescission can occur if a lender acts on the consumer’s rescission notice. See id. at 1183 n.8. 
But if the legislative goal was to make rescission a private remedy that should be worked out 
between the parties themselves, it would seem that judicial action would be a last resort to achieve 
an objective where private interaction has failed. The First Circuit in Belini v. Washington Mutual 
Bank said it best: “section 1635 is written with the goal of making the rescission process a private 
one, worked out between creditor and debtor without the intervention of the courts. The potential for 
damages . . . creates incentives for creditors to rescind mortgages when faced with valid requests 
without forcing debtors to resort to the courts, for such resort causes substantial delay and expense 
for debtors.” Belini v. Washington Mut. Bank, FA, 412 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 135.  Regulation Z provides that the consumer must notify the creditor “by mail, telegram or 
other means of written communication” if he wants to exercise his right to rescind. 12 C.F.R. § 
1026.23(a)(2). 
 136.  See id. §1026.23(a)(3). 
 137.  See Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 264; Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 277; NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 
TRUTH IN LENDING, supra note 25, § 12.2.2.4.1; Third Circuit Finds Rescission Letter Sufficient to 
Exercise TILA Right to Rescind, NCLC REPORTS, CONSUMER CREDIT & USURY EDITION, Jan./Feb. 
2013, at 13-14. 
 138.  See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(d)(2). 
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mandates anything different about notice. 
III. ENFORCING THE RIGHT OF RESCISSION 
A. The Requirement of Tender 
When there is a rescission contest, some courts go through a trial to 
determine if the consumer is justified in rescinding the transaction.139 If 
the consumer prevails in the suit, the court will order rescission only if 
the consumer convinces the court that he is able to return the loan 
proceeds.140 Other courts insist that the consumer’s complaint must 
indicate the consumer’s ability to tender; if not, the consumer runs the 
risk of succumbing to a creditor’s motion to dismiss.141 The rationale for 
this approach is that it is pointless to go through a trial only to find out 
that the consumer is unable to return the creditor’s money. 
Some variations on the theme allow a consumer to plead for a 
reasonable amount of time to tender the unpaid principal. In Powell v. 
Residential Mortgage, for example, the court wanted the consumer to 
admit a present ability to tender the loan proceeds or to provide some 
assurance that he would tender within a reasonable time once the 
consumer suggested he had enough equity in his property to meet his 
obligations after sale.142 The court in Parham v. HSBC Mortgage was 
similarly impressed when the consumer provided evidence that the 
appraisal for her house exceeded the amount due the creditor, thus 
confirming her ability to tender and avoiding the creditor’s motion to 
dismiss.143 If a court finds a consumer’s ability to tender speculative, it 
 
 139.  See Sanders v. Mountain Am. Fed. Credit Union, 689 F.3d 1138, 1143 (10th Cir. 2012); 
Findlay v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 2d 108, 116 (D.D.C. 2011); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. 
Hughes Dev. Co., 684 F. Supp. 616, 621 (D. Minn. 1988), aff’d, 938 F.2d 889 (8th Cir. 1991); 
Agustin v. PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1090 (D. Haw. 2010); Lippner v. 
Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 544 F. Supp. 2d 695, 702-03 (N.D. Ill. 2008); Quenzer v. Advanta 
Mortg. Corp., 288 B.R. 884 (D. Kan. 2003). 
 140.  See supra note 139. 
 141.  Abdel-Malak v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 505, 512 (D. Md. 2010) 
(refusing to prevent sale because consumer could not tender); Briosos v. Wells Fargo Bank, 737 F. 
Supp. 2d 1018, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that consumer must allege facts supporting his 
ability to tender); Cheche v. Wittstat Title & Escrow Co., 723 F. Supp. 2d 851, 859 (E.D. Va. 2010) 
(holding that consumer’s allegations that she “might be able” to tender was not enough to satisfy an 
ability to tender). 
 142.  Powell v. Residential Mortg. Capital, No. C 09-04928 JF (PVT), 2010 WL 2133011, at 
*5 n.4 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2010) (noting that the consumer might be able to allege that he has 
sufficient equity in his home and that a sale thereof could result in tender of loan proceeds). 
 143.  Parham v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., 826 F. Supp. 2d 906, 912 (E.D. Va. 2011) (finding that 
consumer’s allegation that the appraisal of home was sufficient to pay off loan demonstrates 
plausible ability to tender, thus avoiding motion to dismiss), aff’d, 473 F. App’x 244 (4th Cir. 
2012). 
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will not proceed to trial, and a defendant can stop the consumer in his 
tracks. It was not helpful for the consumer in Cheche v. Wittstat & 
Escrow Co. to suggest that she “might be able” to tender the loan 
proceeds after receiving any damages from the creditor for a breach of 
Truth in Lending.144 There was little here to reassure the court that a 
tender would be forthcoming.145 Some courts look for more than a 
possibility that the consumer will tender.146 
Courts like Cheche no doubt receive their inspiration from the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Yamamoto v. Bank of New York,147 where the 
plaintiffs conceded in a motion for summary judgment that they could 
not meet a demand for tender.148 Nevertheless, the district court gave the 
plaintiffs sixty days to tender; but when they could not perform, the 
court did not see any need to move forward on the substantive rescission 
claim.149 In affirming the district court, the Ninth Circuit took an 
opportunity to remind the parties that it could condition rescission on the 
consumer’s ability to carry out the obligation to tender.150 
The Ninth Circuit’s pronouncement in Yamamoto that a court may 
modify the sequence of the parties’ performance, to make sure that the 
consumer can pay back the loan, has led to the determination by many 
lower courts that a consumer must plead his ability to tender the loan 
proceeds to avoid dismissal of the case. Although many of these courts 
are in the Ninth Circuit,151 other courts have also reacted favorably to 
 
 144.  Cheche, 723 F. Supp. 2d 851, 858 (E.D. Va. 2010) (finding that consumer failed to 
demonstrate tender was plausible when she alleged that she “might be able” to tender loan 
proceeds). 
 145.  The court differentiated between an allegation that the consumer “might be able” to 
tender and one that she “can and will” tender. Id. at 858-59. The court in Cheche provided plaintiff 
with an opportunity to amend his complaint. Id. at 859. 
 146.  See Wordell v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. CCB-10-1404, 2011 WL 1005041, at *1 (D. 
Md. March 11, 2011) (finding that consumer’s complaint for rescission would be deficient even if 
time had not expired because consumer did not allege that he could and would tender loan 
proceeds); Hudson v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 3:09-CV-462, 2010 WL 2365588, at *5 (E.D. Va. 
June 11, 2010) (dismissing rescission claim where consumer offered to repay loan proceeds only if 
he was given time to refinance or seek buyer for residence). 
 147.  Yamamoto v. Bank of N.Y., 329 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 148.  See id. at 1169. 
 149.  See id. 
 150.  The court explained: 
There is no reason why a court that may alter the sequence of procedures after deciding 
that rescission is warranted, may not do so before deciding that rescission is warranted 
when it finds that, assuming grounds for rescission exist, rescission still could not be 
enforced because the borrower cannot comply with the borrower’s rescission obligations 
no matter what. 
Id. at 1173. The court was more concerned with making sure that it did not go through a trial 
knowing full well that a consumer could not repay the loan proceeds. See id. 
 151.  See Moore v. ING Bank, FSB, No. C11-139Z, 2011 WL 1832797, at *3 (W.D. Wash. 
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Yamamoto by insisting on this pleading requirement even though 
Yamamoto itself does not require it.152 
B. The Argument Against Tender 
Despite this trend, the Tenth Circuit took the opportunity in 
Sanders v. Mountain America Federal Credit Union153 to reject the 
pleading rule so keenly accepted by many lower courts. The Sanders 
court emphasized that requiring a consumer to plead an ability to tender 
imposes a condition on the rescission remedy that does not appear either 
in the statute or the regulation.154 Such a requirement imposes an 
obligation on the consumer to plead information that might not be 
immediately available, such as the refund of finance charges due the 
consumer. Moreover, since the pleading requirement would apply only 
in judicial proceedings to compel rescission, a creditor would have the 
incentive to ignore the consumer’s rescission until the consumer lodges 
his petition for rescission. The creditor will delay responding to the 
consumer knowing full well that the consumer has to meet the challenge 
of satisfying the tender condition attached to the rescission remedy 
sought.155 
This possibility seems counter to the proposition that Congress 
intended rescission to be a private scheme for the benefit of the parties to 
 
May 13, 2011) (dismissing rescission claim because consumer did not plead ability to tender); 
Tancio v. Saxon Mortg. Servicing, No. C10-0606 PJH, 2011 WL 672641, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 
2011) (granting motion to dismiss where consumer did not plead present ability to tender); Angel v. 
BAC Home Loan Servicing, L.P., Civ. No. 10-00240 HG-LEK, 2010 WL 4386775, at *6 (D. Haw. 
Oct. 26, 2010) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss rescission claim because consumer did not 
allege an ability to repay); Garcia v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 676 F. Supp. 2d 895, 900-01 (C.D. 
Cal. 2009) (dismissing rescission claim because consumer did not allege ability to tender the 
proceeds). 
 152.  See Abdel-Malak v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 505, 512 (D. Md. 
2010) (denying preliminary injunction against sale of property where consumer’s ability to pay debt 
was speculative); see also Cheche v. Wittstat Title & Escrow Co., L.L.C., 723 F. Supp. 2d 851, 859 
(E.D. Va. 2010) (granting motion to dismiss where consumer alleged that she might be able to 
tender loan proceeds); Hintz v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, No. 10-119 (DWF/AJB), 2010 WL 
4220486, at *4 n.2 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2010) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss where 
consumer did not allege an ability to tender loan proceeds), aff’d, 418 Fed. Appx. 567 (8th Cir. 
2011); Arthur B. Axelson & Richard A. Vance, Truth in Lending Update-2011, 67 BUS. LAW. 541, 
551 (2012). 
 153.  Sanders v. Mountain Am. Fed. Credit Union, 689 F.3d 1138 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 154.  See id. at 1143 (recognizing that such a pleading requirement would require consumers to 
plead information that they cannot readily obtain such as the value of the property bought with the 
loan and the exact amount of any refund due them); see also Hindorff v. GSCRP, Inc., No. 13-cv-
00955-PAB-KLM, 2013 WL 2903451, at *6 (D. Colo. June 14, 2013) (finding that lender did not 
provide proper accounting of money due under loan and that although consumer need not plead 
ability to repay, a court may nevertheless impose conditions on rescission). 
 155.  See Sanders, 689 F.3d at 1143. 
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the transaction.156 After all, a pleading requirement of this sort only 
works in the end to put an additional burden on the consumer. Any 
creditor stands to benefit from this prerequisite without having to show 
that it is entitled to equitable relief.157 Congress has already spelled out 
the procedure for rescission, and therefore any deviation therefrom 
should require an assessment of the equities between the parties.158 
Regulation Z requires the creditor to tender first, and therefore a creditor 
must offer some rationale for changing the procedure outlined there.159 
There is a danger in imposing a pleading requirement on the consumer 
because it opens the door to further demands for the consumer to give 
reasons why requiring his tender would be inappropriate.160 So not only 
might a consumer have to plead ability to tender, but he might also have 
to go one step further and convince a court that there is nothing in the 
case to support a change in the statutory routine. 
The Yamamoto decision has its supporters, but also its detractors. 
One significant aspect of the decision was that the plaintiffs left no doubt 
 
 156.  See Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 734 (8th Cir. 2013) (Murphy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that by “placing the initial investigation obligation 
on the lender, Congress evinced a clear intent that an ideal rescission would occur without judicial 
intervention”); Sanders, 689 F.3d at 1143 (finding that Congress intended rescission to be a private 
remedial scheme); Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 545 F.3d 570, 575 (7th Cir. 2008) (same); 
McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418, 421 (1st Cir. 2007) (recognizing that it 
is left to the creditor and consumer to work out the logistics of a rescission); see also S. REP. NO. 
96-368, at 28 (1979). 
 157.  See Sanders, 689 F.3d at 1144 (stating that a court should not exercise its equitable 
powers except when it is necessary to depart from the procedure designated by law); Lenhart v. 
Bank of Am., N.A., No 2:12-cv-4184, 2013 WL 1814820, at *6 (S.D.W.Va. April 29, 2013) (stating 
that consumer’s ability to tender should be a matter for consideration in the court’s exercise of its 
equitable powers rather than as a pleading requirement); Moore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 597 F. 
Supp. 2d 612, 616 (E.D. Va. 2009) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss since consumer did not 
have to plead his ability to tender). 
 158.  See Sanders, 689 F.3d at 1144 (observing that requiring consumer to allege ability to 
tender would inure to creditor’s benefit without creditor’s need for equitable relief); see also 
Findlay v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 2d 108, 116 (D.D.C. 2011) (stating that a pleading 
requirement would conflict with the rescission procedures outlined in TILA); Lonberg v. Freddie 
Mac, 776 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1208 (D. Or. 2011) (denying motion to dismiss rescission claim and 
finding that pleading requirement of tender is unnecessary at that stage). 
 159.  See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(d)(2) (2014). 
 160.  See Reyes v. Premier Home Funding, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1158 (N. D. Cal. 2009) 
(granting defendant’s motion to dismiss because complaint did not allege that conditioning 
rescission on tender would be inappropriate); Montoya v. Countrywide Bank, F.S.B., No. C09-
00641JW, 2009 WL 1813973, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2009) (granting defendant’s motion to 
dismiss because consumer did not allege any ability to tender or that there were equitable 
circumstances suggesting that conditioning rescission on tender would be inappropriate). But see 
Frese v. Empire Fin. Servs., 725 F. Supp. 2d 130, 138 (D.D.C. 2010) (indicating that consumer does 
not have to plead ability to tender but that court may consider consumer’s ability to tender before 
ordering rescission); Lonberg, 776 F. Supp. 2d at 1208 (finding pleading requirement about tender 
unnecessary at pleading stage). 
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they would be unable to tender the loan proceeds even if the court ruled 
in their favor.161 It is questionable, therefore, whether Yamamoto should 
be seen as always demanding assurance from a plaintiff that he can 
tender before a court will consider grounds for rescission. It is one thing 
to recognize a plaintiff’s admission of the inability to make the lender 
whole, but it is quite another to insist on a dismissal of the plaintiff’s 
case because the plaintiff does not make ability to tender an essential 
part of the pleading.162 A court can hardly ignore a consumer’s 
concession about the impossibility of tender, but this does not mean that 
dismissal should be a routine matter that puts the burden on the plaintiff 
to come forward with an assurance of performance. There is something 
to be said for not allowing a lender to dictate its own sequence for the 
parties’ responses by merely creating doubt so early in the process about 
the plaintiff’s ability to tender.163 After all, a premature adjudication 
about that aspect takes the sting out of the defendant’s Truth in Lending 
violation. If a court upholds a consumer’s right to rescind in a particular 
case, then that consumer will have a negotiating position that should not 
be ignored. It is conceivable, indeed, that in the initial stages of litigation 
a rescinding consumer may not see the way clear to return the lender’s 
proceeds, but as time goes on the consumer may be able to work out 
some plan towards that end.164 
 
 161.  See Yamomoto v. Bank of N.Y., 329 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 2003). It is not clear why 
the consumer found it advantageous to give an early indication of their inability to tender when the 
court had made no assessment of the amount due or of the way in which the consumers might fulfill 
their obligations. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING, supra note 25, § 10.7.3.2. 
 162.  See Tacheny v. M & I Marshall & Ilsley Bank, No. 10-CV-2067 (PJS/JJK), 2011 WL 
1657877, at *4 (D. Minn. April 29, 2011) (holding that plaintiffs do not have to plead ability to 
tender in order to state claim under TILA); Soto v. Quicken Loans, No. 09-4862 (JAP), 2010 WL 
5169024, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2010) (finding that inquiry about consumer’s ability to repay loan 
would be premature at pleading stage); Frese, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 138 (holding that consumer does 
not have to plead ability to tender to sustain rescission claim); Savard v. JP Morgan Chase, N.A., 
No. 09-CV-2108-WDM-MJW, 2010 WL 2802543, at *5-6 (D. Colo. July 12, 2010) (denying 
defendant’s motion to dismiss rescission claim where consumer did not plead ability to tender). 
 163.  It is noteworthy that Yamamoto was decided within the context of summary judgment 
when the court could consider evidence to determine whether it should make rescission conditional 
on the consumer’s tender. See Yamamoto v. Bank of N.Y., 329 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 2003). At 
the motion to dismiss stage, a court is concerned only with the pleadings, and the question of the 
consumer’s ability to repay the proceeds does not arise. Therefore, a consumer’s complaint should 
not be dismissed merely because it does not indicate the consumer’s ability to tender the loan 
proceeds. See Findlay, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 116 (finding that consumer does not have to plead ability 
to tender in order to survive motion to dismiss); Lonberg, 776 F. Supp. 2d at1208; Botelho v. U.S. 
Bank, N.A., 692 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1181 (N.D. Calif. 2010). 
 164.  See Carrington v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 760 F. Supp. 2d 589, 598 (E.D. Va. 2010) 
(concluding that consumer’s claim that she would be able to tender funds was enough to withstand 
creditor’s motion to dismiss); Williams v. Saxon Mortg. Co., No. 06-0799-WS-B, 2008 WL 45739, 
at *6 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 2, 2008) (declining to grant summary judgment to creditor based on mere 
possibility that consumers may find it difficult to refinance loan). 
31
Griffith: Challenges Under Truth in Ledning
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
194 AKRON LAW REVIEW [48:163 
A borrower may signal his intention not to return the loan proceeds 
by instead offering the home that secures the lender’s mortgage. This 
may not be a satisfactory solution, since the property may be worth next 
to nothing and the borrower will enjoy an advantage to which he is not 
entitled. It was not surprising, therefore, when the court in Siver v. 
CitiMortgage, Inc.165 followed the Ninth Circuit’s guidance in 
Yamamoto by requiring the borrowers to show that they could tender the 
amount owed to the lender.166 After all, the borrowers had indicated their 
willingness to turn over their home or sign a new promissory note in the 
lender’s favor.167 Neither of these proposals seemed consistent with the 
statutory requirements for rescission. The borrowers could not have 
made it any clearer that they were not going to return the loan proceeds. 
They were looking instead for an alternative that might satisfy the 
lender. The lender would have none of it, and it was then left for the 
court to set the record straight about what the borrowers had to do if they 
wanted to rescind. Since the borrowers had declared their hand, the court 
had the straightforward assignment of reminding them of the statutory 
mandate. The borrowers had hoped the court would force the creditor to 
take action before they had to tender the proceeds. But even then, they 
were not offering the proceeds, but rather the house itself.168 It would 
have been pointless for the court to follow the literal statutory steps 
when the borrowers had already opted to substitute their own restitution 
for that of the loan proceeds. 
In Carlos v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC,169 the borrowers 
introduced a variation on the theme by offering to turn over to the lender 
their home or its fair market value.170 The borrowers did not seem to 
view their tender of the proceeds as an immediate requirement since 
their alternative strategy was to pay the proceeds in installments if the 
 
 165.  Siver v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1194 (W.D. Wash. 2011). 
 166.  Id. at 1198 (stating that the borrowers could not merely return the property or give a quit 
claim deed to lender, but must tender the amount owed to the lender). 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Courts have not accepted this idea of tendering the borrower’s home instead of the loan 
proceeds. See Moore v. ING Bank, FSB, No. C11-139Z, 2011 WL 1832797, at *3 (W.D. Wash. 
May 13, 2011) (stating that offer to turn over real property was not sufficient to satisfy rescission); 
Brunat v. IndyMac Fed. Bank, No. CV-09-1796-PHX-FJM, 2011 WL 1304589, at *3 (D. Ariz. 
April 6, 2011) (holding that offer to turn over the property secured by the loan is not a sufficient 
tender to support claim for rescission); Curtis v. Option One Mortg. Corp., No. 1:09-CV-1982 AWI 
SMS, 2010 WL 2879842, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2010) (stating that § 1635(b) requires consumer 
to return loan proceeds and not the property securing the loan); Moore v. Wells Fargo Bank, 597 F. 
Supp. 2d 612, 616 n.2 (E.D. Va. 2009) (stating that the property the consumer must tender is the 
loan proceeds). 
 169.  Carlos v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. CV F 09-0260 LJO GSA, 2009 WL 1295873 
(E.D. Cal. May 8, 2009). 
 170.  Id. at *3. 
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court did not accept their first proposal.171 The borrowers in Carlos were 
not as plain spoken as those in Yamamoto, but the message was the 
same. The likelihood of restoring the parties to the status quo ante was 
remote, and the court in Carlos wanted to follow the Yamamoto model 
by deferring adjudication of the rescission claim if the plaintiffs could 
not meet their statutory obligation by returning the proceeds.172 
Despite the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Yamamoto, many courts do 
not require a borrower to show an ability to tender before actually 
adjudicating a rescission claim.173 Nevertheless, they support conditional 
rescission in appropriate cases, so that a lender will still have protection 
pending a borrower’s return of the loan’s proceeds.174 In Iroanyah v. 
Bank of America, N.A.,175 the district court gave a recent example of 
conditional rescission, confirming that “it would be inequitable to 
require a creditor to realize its security interest and return the borrower’s 
payments if it appears that the creditor might not receive back the 
principal.”176 Faced with the requirement of tender, the borrowers 
wanted to make payments in monthly installments over the life of the 
original loan.177 This would have been a remarkable arrangement, since 
the court would then have modified the loan on more favorable terms 
than if the loan was still in effect, with the installments bearing no 
interest.178 In Iroanyah, the borrowers conceded that they suffered no 
 
 171.  See id. at *4. 
 172.  See id. The defendant in Carlos was concerned in any event that the property was worth 
less than the amount of the debt. See id. 
 173.  See, e.g., Butler v. F.D.I.C., No. 11 CV 6692, 2012 WL 1939109, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 
2012) (holding that consumer need not plead ability to tender in order to state claim for rescission); 
Tacheny v. M & I Marshall & Ilsley Bank, No. 10-CV-2067 (PJS/JJK), 2011 WL 1657877, at *4 
(D. Minn. April 29, 2011) (finding that requiring consumer to plead present ability to tender would 
dramatically “alter the statutory scheme in favor of lenders”); Frese v. Empire Fin. Servs., 725 F. 
Supp. 2d 130, 138 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding that consumer’s ability to tender is not a pleading 
requirement for rescission); Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Pelletier, 31 A.3d 1235, 1239 (Me. 
2011) (holding that consumers were not required to tender before grant of rescission). 
 174.  See Am. Mortg. Network, Inc. v. Shelton, 486 F.3d 815, 821 (4th Cir. 2007); Fed. Dep. 
Ins. Co. v. Hughes Dev. Co., 684 F. Supp. 616, 625 (D. Minn. 1988), aff’d, 938 F.2d 889 (8th Cir. 
1991); Ramirez v. Household Fin. Corp., (In re Ramirez), 329 B.R. 727, 742 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2005); 
Rudisell v. Fifth Third Bank, 622 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1980); Zimmerman v. Logemann, No. 09-CV-
210, 2011 WL 1674956 (W.D. Wis. March 17, 2011); Jones v. Rees-Max, LLC, 514 F. Supp. 2d 
1139 (D. Minn. 2007); AFS Fin., Inc. v. Burdette, 105 F. Supp. 2d 881 (N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 175.  Iroanyah v. Bank of Am., N.A., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
 176.  Id. at 1125-26. 
 177.  Id. at 1126. 
 178.  The court was doubtful whether a long-term installment plan could be characterized as 
rescission rather than reformation of the loan. See id. at 1127. For example, in Shepeard v. Quality 
Siding & Window Factory, Inc., when the borrower rescinded, the defendant had already installed 
siding on the borrower’s property. The court allowed the borrower to continue making the same 
installment payments contained in the contract between the parties. See Shepeard v. Quality Siding 
& Window Factory, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 1295, 1308 (D. Del. 1990). It was as if nothing had changed 
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actual harm from the lender’s violations, yet they were still seeking to 
implement an installment plan that in effect reformed, rather than 
rescinded, the loan. 
The court would have none of it, preferring instead to give the 
borrowers three months to tender.179 The court was unimpressed by other 
decisions that had given borrowers time to pay that ran as long as a 
year.180 In at least one case the court allowed the borrower to make the 
same monthly payment to complete his tender obligation that he was 
making under the original security arrangement.181 Of course, the 
borrower did not have to pay any finance charges under the new 
arrangement.182 The Iroanyah court was skeptical that a long-term 
installment plan could fairly be identified as rescission rather than 
reformation of the original loan.183 This skepticism seemed reasonable 
enough in light of the rationale for rescission. If the idea is to restore the 
parties to the status quo ante, then one should expect courts to devise 
some mechanism for achieving that goal in short order without recasting 
the loan in a way that keeps it alive, rather than rescinding it. In 
Iroanyah, the court saw three months as the shortest time for the 
borrower to wrap things up,184 so that there would be no room for a 
magical transformation of the transaction that would leave the parties 
tied to an interest-free arrangement over the original loan period. It is 
reasonable for a court to give the borrower sufficient time to seek other 
financing in order to satisfy his tender obligation, but the parties should 
not be forced into an installment plan that produces more favorable 
terms for the consumer. This is why some courts bend over backwards to 
make sure that any modification plans include interest for the lender.185 
It is an effective compromise that recognizes a consumer’s right to 
rescind without insisting on an immediate payback, while at the same 
 
from the original arrangement; see also Mayfield v. Vanguard Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 710 F. Supp. 
143, 149 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (ordering consumer to pay off loan in monthly installments equal to the 
same amount she had been paying on her previous mortgage payments). 
 179.  See Iroanyah, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 1127. 
 180.  See id. (citing Yamamoto v. Bank of N.Y., 329 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003); Fed. 
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hughes Dev. Co., 938 F.2d 889, 890 (8th Cir. 1991)). 
 181.  Id. at 1126-27. 
 182.  Id. at 1126. 
 183.  See id. at 1127. 
 184.  See id. 
 185.  See Coleman v. Crossroads Lending Grp., Inc., No. 09-CV-0221 (PJS/FLN), 2010 WL 
4676984, at *9 (D. Minn. Nov. 9, 2010) (finding that consumer can pay in installments with interest 
at a rate that is no more than necessary to compensate lender for inflation); Dawson v. Thomas (In 
re Dawson), 411 B.R. 1, 43 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2008) (ordering that consumer must repay net loan 
proceeds with interest); Sterten v. Option One Mortg. Corp. (In re Sterten), 352 B.R. 380, 390 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) (same). 
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time ensuring that the lender’s interests are protected. 
IV. NOTICE ABOUT THE RIGHT TO RESCIND 
A. Identifying the Right Date 
A creditor should normally not have any difficulty in giving 
adequate notice to the consumer of the right to rescind, for the 
regulation’s model form provides the language and format for such a 
disclosure.186 Nevertheless, some creditors get into trouble by failing to 
identify the date when the right of rescission expires, or by giving a date 
that precedes the time when the creditor gives the necessary disclosure 
to the consumer.187 In some instances, therefore, a creditor converts the 
rescission disclosure into a mass of confusion. The resulting ambiguity 
is not necessarily a result of a creditor’s lack of interest in giving the 
right information about the critical date for rescinding. It is instead a 
result of the creditor’s inability to be consistent in disclosing the features 
of the rescission timeline. Creditors should bear the burden of 
determining the critical date for rescission and clearly relaying this 
information to the consumer in writing. 
The drafters of TILA developed an impressive scheme for ensuring 
that the consumer understands when the right to rescind expires. The 
three-day period is geared to follow the date of the transaction, the date 
of receipt of the Truth in Lending disclosures, or the date the consumer 
receives the notice of the right to cancel, whichever occurs last.188 The 
creditor must then also give a specific date by which the consumer must 
 
 186.  See 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, app. H-8 (2014) (Rescission Model Form (General)). 
 187.  Regulation Z gives a consumer the right to rescind until midnight of the third business 
day following consummation, delivery of the notice of the right to rescind, or delivery of all 
material disclosures, whichever happens last. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(a)(3)(i) (2014). The model form 
stipulates as follows: 
Your Right to Cancel 
You are entering into a transaction that will result in a [mortgage/lien security interest] 
[on/in] your home. You have a legal right under federal law to cancel this transaction, 
without cost, within three business days from whichever of the following events occurs 
last: 
(1) the date of the transaction, which is _____________; 
(2) the date you received your Truth in Lending disclosures; or 
(3) the date you received this notice of the right to cancel. 
12 C.F.R. pt. 226, app. H-8. Another part of the model form allows a creditor to indicate the 
expiration date for the right of rescission in this way: “If you cancel by mail or telegram, you must 
send the notice no later than midnight of (date) (or midnight of the third business day following the 
latest of the three events listed above).” Id. A creditor can cause problems by not filling in the right 
date on the form. 
 188.  See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(a)(3)(i). 
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rescind.189 It is this date that occasionally causes problems for creditors, 
especially if the creditor delays in making the necessary disclosures and 
the original expiration date of the consumer’s right of rescission is no 
longer consistent with the creditor’s timeline. The doubt about when the 
three-day rescission period expires raises questions about the clarity and 
conspicuousness of the creditor’s disclosures. If the creditor leaves out a 
specific date for rescission, the consumer must then compute the three 
business days that will end the consumer’s right to rescind. It is not 
always easy to do this even when the date of consummation coincides 
with the actual date of disclosures. 
In an early case, the Ninth Circuit would not accept the creditor’s 
argument that the omission of the expiration date on the disclosure form 
was only a technical violation that did not merit relief. The court in 
Semar v. Platte Valley Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n190 resisted the 
creditor’s invitation to use its equitable powers to avoid strict application 
of TILA for borrowers who did not really need protection.191 The 
creditor tried to persuade the court that the technicality attached to the 
expiration date of the rescission period did not warrant a violation in the 
absence of sympathetic plaintiffs, and these plaintiffs were not of that 
variety.192 Nevertheless, the court recognized that TILA required a 
creditor to give a specific date for the expiration of the consumer’s right 
of rescission; a creditor could use the bona fide error defense in 
appropriate cases to resist a consumer’s allegations that the creditor did 
not comply with the requirement of a specific date.193 In Semar, the 
creditor’s notice omitted a specific expiration date but indicated that the 
right of rescission expired “three business days after July 16.”194 It 
seemed simple enough for the consumer to compute the expiration date, 
given the designation of July 16. But this still would have left the 
consumer in a quandary if he was not sure about which day was a 
 
 189.  The creditor’s failure to give the date on which the rescission period expires is one of the 
events that will extend the right of rescission for three years. See Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n, 791 F.2d 699, 701-02 (9th Cir. 1986); New Maine Nat’l Bank v. Gendron, 780 F. Supp. 
52 (D. Me. 1991); Aubin v. Residential Funding Co., LLC, 565 F. Supp. 2d 392, 395 (D. Conn. 
2008). 
 190.  Semar, 791 F.2d at 699. 
 191.  See id. at 704. 
 192.  The court made the point: “Congress did not intend for TILA to apply only to 
sympathetic consumers; Congress designed the law to apply to all consumers, who are inherently at 
a disadvantage in loan and credit transactions.” Id. at 705. 
 193.  The bona fide error defense allows a creditor to show that “the violation was not 
intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures 
reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c) (2012). 
 194.  Semar, 791 F.2d at 702. 
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business day for rescission purposes,195 and that is why the regulation 
took care of that possibility by requiring a definite date.196 
B. The Problem of Competing Dates 
If the creditor’s notice to the consumer gives the correct date for the 
consumer to exercise the right to rescind, but gives the wrong transaction 
date, the result may be different. In Young v. Bank of New York 
Mellon,197 the transaction date on the creditor’s notice was March 16, 
and the expiration date for rescission was March 22.198 Since the 
consumer received her disclosures and the notice about the right of 
rescission on March 19, the court found no violation because the creditor 
had complied with the regulation by giving an expiration date that came 
three days after the consumer received the notice and disclosures.199 
Unlike Semar, there was no missing expiration date in Young, and since 
the creditor in Young had disclosed the expiration date as three business 
days following the latest of three events covered in the regulation, the 
consumer had no cause for complaint.200 
Even when a creditor gives a specific date by which cancellation 
must occur, questions may arise if the creditor’s notice of the 
consumer’s right to rescind gives a rescission deadline that has already 
passed. In Palmer v. Champion Mortgage,201 the First Circuit found 
nothing wrong with this scenario because the creditor’s misstatement of 
the deadline date was counteracted by the explanatory parenthetical 
phrase relating to “midnight of the third business day following the latest 
of . . . three (3) events.”202 The Palmer court’s approach really put the 
burden on the consumer to examine both the stated deadline date and the 
date relating to the period after the third business day.203 It was only by 
 
 195.  Regulation Z defines “business day” for rescission purposes as “all calendar days except 
Sundays and the legal public holidays specified in 5 U.S.C. 6103(a), such as New Year’s Day, the 
Birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr., Washington’s Birthday, Memorial Day, Independence Day, 
Labor Day, Columbus Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day.” 12 C.F.R. § 
1026.2(a)(6) (2014). 
 196.  The specific expiration date for rescinding is supposed to correlate with the explanatory 
language in the model form relating to the third business day following the last of three events 
mentioned in § 1026.23(a)(3)(i) and repeated by the model form. 
 197.  Young v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 848 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Haw. 2012). 
 198.  Id. at 1186-87. 
 199.  Id. at 1190. 
 200.  See id. n.8. 
 201.  Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 202.  Id. at 29. 
 203.  It is questionable whether the drafters intended to give a consumer the assignment to treat 
the period following the third business day as an alternate calculation, thus relieving the creditor of 
the obligation to ensure the accuracy of its disclosures. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., TRUTH IN 
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doing this that the consumer would have realized that the specific 
rescission date was no longer operative and that the consumer then had 
to decide when the third business day ended following the delivery of 
the rescission notice.204 The First Circuit found the creditor’s rescission 
notice acceptable despite the passage of the rescission deadline because 
the consumer still could rely on the alternate date.205 
The Palmer decision gives the creditor an option to provide either a 
correct, specific date for rescission or, in the alternative, the model 
language relating to the third business day. It seems hardly reasonable 
that this would satisfy the clear and conspicuous requirement imposed 
on the creditor.206 The Truth in Lending scheme did not intend to 
accommodate this kind of flexibility that sends a message to the 
consumer to be cautious about the accuracy of the date. It seems more 
consistent with Truth in Lending’s objectives to treat the parenthetical 
about the third business day as explaining or describing the specific date 
set out in the creditor’s rescission notice, and not as offering an 
alternative for arriving at a rescission deadline. If a consumer cannot rely 
on the accuracy of a specific date, he will hardly be comforted by 
reference to a third business day. The consumer must first be familiar 
with the definition of a business day if the reference is to stand on its 
own as a definitive time period for exercise of the right to rescind.207 It is 
 
LENDING, supra note 25, § 10.4.4.7.3. Regulation Z requires a creditor to disclose clearly and 
conspicuously “[t]he date the rescission period expires.” 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(b)(1)(v) (2014). It is 
reasonable to assume that this means the correct date. 
 204.  It is more convincing to treat the deadline date as describing when the rescission period 
ends rather than as an alternate formulation in case there is a discrepancy between that date and the 
date following the expiration of the third business day. Furthermore, the definition of “business 
day” poses a challenge for the average consumer. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.2(a)(6) (2014). 
 205.  The Palmer court could not understand “how any reasonably alert person—that is, the 
average consumer—reading the Notice would be drawn to the April 1 deadline without also 
grasping the twice-repeated alternative deadlines.” Palmer, 465 F.3d at 29. This use of “alternative” 
in this context seems to place the burden on the consumer to make sure that the deadline date is 
consistent with the parenthetical phrase relating to the third business day following the last of the 
three listed events. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING, supra note 25, § 
10.4.4.7.3. 
 206.  Regulation Z allows a consumer to rescind until midnight of the third business day 
following consummation, delivery of the notice of the right to rescind, or delivery of all material 
disclosures, whichever comes last. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(a)(3)(i). The notice of the right to rescind 
must include, among other items, the date the rescission period expires. Id. § 1026.23(b)(1)(v). A 
creditor’s disclosure of the wrong date should itself constitute a violation. 
 207.  The definition of “business day” is hardly routine for the average consumer. For example, 
Saturday is a business day for rescission purposes. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.2(a)(6). If a certain federal 
holiday falls on a Saturday, but is observed on the preceding Friday, the observed day is 
nevertheless a business day for rescission purposes. Official Staff Commentary, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, 
supp. 1, cmt. 2(a)(6)-2 (2014). The court in Aubin admitted surprise that the definition of “business 
day” included a Saturday. Aubin v. Residential Funding, Co., LLC, 565 F. Supp. 2d 392, 397 (D. 
Conn. 2008). 
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more meaningful to read the “business” day designation as reflecting 
how the creditor arrived at its specific rescission date, since the creditor 
is in the best position to make the necessary calculations about that date. 
The Palmer court found that the creditor’s notice was “crystal 
clear” because it used the alternative deadline relating to the three 
business days that followed the date the creditor gave the notice.208 Thus 
it was not critical that the consumer received his notices after the 
specific designated date. In the court’s view, the technical misstatement 
of the date did not matter once the notice provided sufficient information 
about the final date for the consumer to exercise his right of 
rescission.209 
The First Circuit continued this thinking in Melfi v. WMC Mortgage 
Corp., where the creditor used the model form for the rescission notice, 
but left blank the spaces for the date of the transaction and the rescission 
deadline. 210 Nevertheless, the court was convinced that any reasonable 
person would have been able to arrive at the final date for rescission 
despite the blanks.211 The consumer in Melfi knew the date of the loan 
closing, and it was therefore easy for him to compute the three business 
days that followed that date.212 The court acknowledged, however, that if 
a creditor provides the correct information, the consumer avoids the risk 
of miscalculating the rescission period if he does not know, for example, 
that Saturday is a business day.213 The court seemed comfortable in 
having the consumer assume this risk. But the statute itself provides a 
safe harbor for a creditor only if that creditor properly completes the 
model form.214 Congress must have contemplated that a creditor would 
give the proper disclosures. The relevant inquiry, therefore, is not 
whether a reasonable borrower made the right computations about the 
final date for rescission, but whether the creditor provided the correct 
date to prevent the consumer from having to calculate the three business 
days relating to rescission.215 
 
 208.  Palmer, 465 F.3d at 29. 
 209.  It is arguable that a creditor is in better shape if he gives an incorrect deadline date 
instead of omitting the date altogether. Compare Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 
791 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1986), with Palmer, 465 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 210.  Melfi v. WMC Mortg. Corp., 568 F.3d 309 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 211.  See id. at 313. 
 212.  The court seemed to regard the missing information as a technical deficiency that did not 
prevent the borrower from getting effective notice about the final date for rescission. See id. at 312. 
 213.  See id. It is questionable whether the court should have underestimated the risk involved 
in leaving the consumer to calculate the rescission period when he may not be sure about the 
definition of a business day. It seems reasonable that the information required by the notice is 
intended to ensure that the consumer does not have to guess about dates. 
 214.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(h) (2012). 
 215.  See Williamson v. Lafferty, 698 F.2d 767, 769 n.3 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that the 
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The search for clarity and conspicuousness continued in Aubin v. 
Residential Funding Co.,216 where the creditor dated the rescission 
notice February 28 instead of March 1, when the closing actually took 
place and the consumers received the notice.217 As a result, the creditor 
mistakenly showed the rescission deadline as March 3, which was 
incorrect because the closing took place on March 1, and thus the three-
day rescission period did not expire until March 4.218 
Even though the court was willing to assume that a creditor does 
not have to give perfect notice under Truth in Lending, it still demanded 
clear and conspicuous notice.219 The question was whether the notice in 
Aubin met that standard. There was no question that the rescission notice 
failed to provide the correct expiration date, and so the creditor hoped 
that the language about three business days would save the day. This 
was somewhat reminiscent of the Palmer approach.220 The alternative 
language did not help the creditor’s position in Aubin because, although 
the rescission notice referred to “business days,” it did not give the 
slightest hint about what days were business days, and the actual 
expiration date fell on a Saturday.221 Therefore, a consumer could get no 
help from the alternative formulation if the precise rescission date 
happened to be incorrect. The average consumer would have difficulty 
in determining when the three business days ended, and therefore there 
was no clear and conspicuous disclosure.222 
In Aubin the creditor tried to convince the court that it should 
follow Palmer, which found no fault with the creditor giving the 
consumer the notice of the right to rescind after the expiration date in the 
 
creditor should fill in the expiration date for rescission so that the consumer will not have to 
calculate the three business days); Little v. Bank of Am., N.A., 769 F. Supp. 2d 954, 962 (E.D. Va. 
2011) (finding that creditor’s failure to state rescission deadline in the notice of the right to cancel 
was enough to constitute a violation); Mayfield v. Vanguard Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 710 F. Supp. 143, 
146 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (stating that creditor’s failure to specify the expiration date for rescission 
violated statute). 
 216.  Aubin v. Residential Funding Co., 565 F. Supp. 2d 392 (D. Conn. 2008). 
 217.  Id. at 393-94. 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  Id. at 396. 
 220.  In Palmer, the notice of the right to rescind gave a rescission deadline of April 1, 2003, 
but the consumer did not receive the notice until after the April 1 date. Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 
465 F.3d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 2006). The court took the view that the notice was not defective because, 
despite the April 1 deadline, the notice also informed the consumer that she had three business days 
to rescind from the date she received her disclosures. Id. 
 221.  See Aubin, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 397. For purposes of rescission, Saturday is a business day. 
12 C.F.R. § 1026.2(a)(6) (2014). The court was convinced that the average consumer believes that 
Saturday is not a business day. See Aubin, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 397. 
 222.  Aubin, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 398. 
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notice had passed.223 The Aubin court was unwilling to go along because 
it viewed the Palmer notice as containing the correct expiration date, 
whereas the Aubin notice did not: the creditor had misstated the date of 
the transaction, thus leading to an incorrect expiration date.224 It is 
puzzling that the Aubin court recognized the Palmer notice as stating a 
correct expiration date, even though the consumer did not receive the 
notice until after the stated date, and the three-day period could not have 
expired until the creditor had given its disclosures and the rescission 
notice. The Palmer rescission date could only have been correct if the 
three stated events in the notice had all occurred on the same day, thus 
causing the three business days to expire thereafter. The Palmer date 
found favor with the Aubin court because the consumer could have 
computed the three business days once the last event had occurred. The 
Aubin court found this to be an acceptable alternative to an expiration 
date, even if the precise expiration date was no longer applicable 
because the creditor had not yet fulfilled its obligations.225 
One wonders whether the Aubin court would have been 
sympathetic to the consumer’s cause if the actual expiration date had 
fallen on a Friday. In that event, the consumer would not have been 
confused about a business day, and the court would have readily 
accepted the Palmer solution to the problem. It is arguable that the 
consumer in Palmer was aware that the rescission deadline had already 
passed when he received his rescission notice, and therefore it was 
unreasonable for him to rely on that expiration date in assessing his right 
to rescind.226 However, it is questionable whether the disclosure of a 
wrong expiration date fulfills the creditor’s obligation to make clear and 
conspicuous disclosure of the rescission’s expiration date.227 It would 
seem that the creditor is responsible for informing the consumer of the 
right to rescind, and part of the information to be included in that notice 
is “[t]he date the rescission period expires.”228 There is nothing in 
Regulation Z to suggest that a creditor has flexibility in determining 
 
 223.  In Palmer, the creditor prevailed because the consumer could see from the notice that the 
three business days for rescission began only when the consumer received her disclosures. See 
Palmer, 465 F.3d at 28. 
 224.  See Aubin, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 399. 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  See Palmer, 465 F.3d at 28 (stating that courts must evaluate adequacy of Truth in 
Lending disclosures from the position of the average consumer); Smith v. Cash Store Mgmt., Inc., 
195 F.3d 325, 327-28 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that Truth in Lending disclosures must be viewed 
from the ordinary customer’s perspective). 
 227.  The creditor must “clearly and conspicuously” disclose certain information in the notice 
that it gives to the consumer about the right to rescind. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 
1026.23(b)(1) (2014). 
 228.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(b)(1)(v). 
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such a date, and a consumer should not have the burden of reaching the 
right result if the creditor has misled him about the expiration date. It is 
understandable that a creditor would rely on the regulation’s model form 
for guidance, but that form does not protect a creditor from liability for 
errors of substance in completing the form containing disclosures to the 
consumer.229 
The result in Barnes v. Chase Home Finance230 is more 
representative of the judicial treatment of incorrect rescission dates. In 
that case, the creditor’s notice about the consumer’s right of rescission 
indicated a rescission deadline of November 17 instead of November 18, 
thus creating an inconsistency with the deadline date that flowed from 
the narrative language relating to three business days.231 The court 
denied the creditor’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the notice was 
not clear and conspicuous because the creditor’s notice stated an 
incorrect deadline date.232 This decision seemed reasonable and 
consistent with other cases dealing with the rescission deadline,233 but 
even in Barnes the court seemed to appreciate the distinction in Palmer 
that the rescission deadline stated in the rescission notice had already 
expired when the consumer received that notice from the creditor.234 The 
incorrect rescission date indicated in Barnes was in fact one day before 
the actual expiration date for rescission, and according to the court that 
fact made the notice less clear and conspicuous.235 The creditor had 
therefore created an inconsistency between the narrative relating to three 
business days and the expiration date stated in the notice. The Barnes 
court appreciated the possibility of the consumer being confused by 
 
 229.  A creditor may even rearrange the format of a model form as long as it does not affect the 
“substance, clarity, or meaningful sequence of the disclosure.” 15 U.S.C. § 1604(b) (2012). 
 230.  Barnes v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 825 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (D. Or. 2011). 
 231.  Id. at 1058. 
 232.  Id. at 1070. 
 233.  See Williamson v. Lafferty, 698 F.2d 767, 768 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that omission of 
expiration date for rescission violated statute); Stanton v. Bank of Am., N.A., 834 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 
1081 (D. Haw. 2011) (holding that consumer did not receive clear and conspicuous notice of right 
to cancel because notice did not give specific cancellation date); Peterson-Price v. U.S. Bank Nat’l 
Ass’n, No. 09-495 ADM/JSM, 2010 WL 1782188, at *7 (D. Minn. May 4, 2010) (dismissing 
lender’s motion for summary judgment where rescission notice omitted expiration date); Aubin v. 
Residential Funding Co., 565 F. Supp. 2d 392, 397 (D. Conn. 2008) (finding violation where 
rescission notice stated wrong deadline date). 
 234.  The Barnes court explained: 
This matter is distinct from Palmer, in that the date used in Palmer had already passed at 
the time of closing, which logically would render unreasonable a borrower’s reliance on 
that date if he was trying to determine when his right of rescission expired because it 
obviously could not expire before the transaction was consummated. 
Barnes, 825 F. Supp. 2d at 1070. 
 235.  See id. 
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different dates, but was not sympathetic to the consumer’s plight in 
Palmer because the stated deadline for rescission had already passed 
when the consumer received the rescission notice.236 The average 
consumer would have understood the impossibility of having such a 
rescission date in the context of the Palmer notice. There was no such 
impossibility in Barnes. 
V. PREMATURE ELECTION NOT TO RESCIND 
A. Conflicting Statements 
It is no secret that a consumer’s right to rescind can leave a 
transaction unsettled for as long as three years if a creditor does not 
make the necessary disclosures.237 Some creditors try to avoid the 
possibility of the consumer’s rescission by having the consumer sign, at 
the same time that the consumer signs the loan documents, a statement 
that he has elected not to rescind the transaction.238 This so-called 
“premature election not to cancel” sometimes carries the same date as 
the loan documents; other times, a date that is three days later. When the 
election statement given at closing indicates that the consumer’s 
rescission period has expired, this represents a mischaracterization of the 
consumer’s three-day right of rescission.239 If the three-day period has 
not yet expired, but the statement says that it has, the creditor is 
essentially leading the consumer to a distortion of the transaction. After 
all, the creditor should give the consumer a clear and conspicuous notice 
of the consumer’s right to rescind, and the creditor cannot achieve this 
goal with conflicting statements.240 The conflict is even more serious if 
 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Regulation Z provides in pertinent part as follows: “If the required notice or material 
disclosures are not delivered, the right to rescind shall expire 3 years after consummation, upon 
transfer of all the consumer’s interest in the property, or upon sale of the property, whichever occurs 
first.” 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(a)(3)(i) (2014). 
 238.  See Rand Corp. v. Yer Song Moua, 559 F.3d 842, 847-48 (8th Cir. 2009); Rodash v. AIB 
Mortg. Co., 16 F.3d 1142, 1146 (11th Cir. 1994); Adams v. Nationscredit Fin. Servs. Corp., 351 F. 
Supp. 2d 829, 833 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Wiggins v. Avco Fin. Servs., 62 F. Supp. 2d 90, 96-97 (D.D.C. 
1999). 
 239.  See Conrad v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 762 F. Supp. 2d 843, 846-47 (W.D. Va. 2011) 
(stating that requiring consumer to sign postdated statement that consumer had not rescinded did not 
fulfill the clear and conspicuous requirement for disclosure); Daniels v. Equitable Bank, SSB, 746 
F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1023 (finding post-dated form not to rescind to be a violation of the clear 
disclosure requirement that consumer could rescind within three days); Rodrigues v. Members 
Mortg. Co., 323 F. Supp. 2d 202, 209 (D. Mass. 2004) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss 
where consumer was required to sign both notice to rescind and confirmation of non-rescission). 
 240.  The notice of the right to rescind must “clearly and conspicuously” disclose certain 
information to the consumer. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(b)(1). 
43
Griffith: Challenges Under Truth in Ledning
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
206 AKRON LAW REVIEW [48:163 
the premature election not to cancel appears in the same document as the 
creditor’s notice to the consumer about the right of rescission.241 A 
consumer will usually be eager to consummate the transaction and will 
hardly be of a mind to appreciate the effect of a simultaneous election 
not to cancel. If anything, the consumer is likely to get the impression 
that he must sign as requested if he hopes to get the loan. If there is only 
one signature line that purports to cover both the acknowledgment of the 
creditor’s notice and the consumer’s premature election not to cancel, 
there is an even stronger case for finding a Truth in Lending violation 
because the consumer may be misled into thinking there is no choice 
about what to do. 
It is no answer to say that a consumer waives his right to cancel 
under the regulation. While there is room for a waiver of the right of 
rescission, that waiver is available only in emergency situations and 
pursuant to a prescribed format.242 A creditor’s attempt to circumvent the 
waiver requirements usually fails simply because there is no emergency 
and the creditor is the one who wants to avoid the possibility of 
rescission. 
The creditor in Rodash v. AIB Mortgage Co.243 should have sensed 
the difficulty it would have in convincing the Eleventh Circuit about the 
way it handled the disclosure of the consumer’s right to rescind. It 
complied with Truth in Lending requirements by giving the consumer 
adequate notice about the right to rescind, but then confused matters by 
requiring the consumer to sign a separate document acknowledging that 
the creditor had given her a notice of her right to rescind, but also 
affirming in the same paragraph that the consumer had elected not to 
cancel the transaction.244 
It was hardly surprising when the court found that the creditor did 
not give clear and conspicuous disclosure of the consumer’s right to 
rescind.245 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the contradictory 
 
 241.  See Conrad, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 846 (finding that requiring consumer to sign postdated 
confirmation of election not to rescind constituted violation even if the practice was prevalent in the 
industry); Wiggins, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 96 (finding that placing the election not to cancel on the same 
pages as the notices of the right to rescind was objectively confusing because the average consumer 
might think that he had to sign the non-rescission statement in order to consummate transaction). 
 242.  See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(e). 
 243.  Rodash, 16 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 244.  The consumer signed a pre-printed form containing the following language: 
The undersigned hereby acknowledges and affirms that on or before January 18, 1991, 
each of us received two copies of the annexed “Notice of Right to Cancel.” Furthermore, 
the undersigned hereby acknowledges and affirms that each of us have [sic] elected not 
to cancel the transaction to which the annexed Notice relates. /s/ Martha Rodash 
Id. at 1145 n.2. 
 245.  See id. at 1146 (holding that requiring the consumer to sign an election not to rescind 
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documents prevented clear and conspicuous disclosure from 
happening.246 By introducing into the mix the election not to cancel, the 
creditor sent a false message that a waiver was routinely available during 
the three-day cooling-off period.247 There was a contradiction here that 
nullified the consumer’s right to reflect on the transaction for three days. 
Furthermore, the consumer’s acknowledgment that she had elected not 
to cancel suggested that the parties had reached the point of no return, 
with the possibility of rescission out of the way. The creditor’s 
placement of the acknowledgment and the election not to cancel in the 
same paragraph was sure to confuse the borrower, for the creditor 
simultaneously gave and then took away the same thing in one 
paragraph. The consumer would hardly know what to make of this 
inconsistent message.248 It had a good chance of misleading the 
consumer, for she may have believed that she had to sign the purported 
waiver if she wanted to consummate the transaction. 
B. Acknowledgment and Confirmation 
A little after Rodash, the Eleventh Circuit had another chance to 
reflect on the consumer’s acknowledgment that the consumer had 
received a notice about his right of rescission appearing on the same 
page as the consumer’s confirmation that the consumer had not 
rescinded. The court was keen to distinguish the situation in Smith v. 
Highland Bank249 from that in Rodash. The certification in Smith 
appeared on the same page as the consumer’s acknowledgment, but in a 
separate paragraph which called for a separate signature.250 This 
arrangement certainly diminished the consumer’s argument that the 
layout had produced a confusing situation. Furthermore, the certification 
indicated that the consumer was not to sign until three days had expired, 
and it was indeed dated several days after the acknowledgment of receipt 
of the right to rescind.251 This was in contrast to the Rodash arrangement 
where the acknowledgment and the purported waiver appeared in the 
 
prevented the clear and conspicuous notice of the consumer’s right to rescind). 
 246.  Id. at 1147. 
 247.  See id. at 1146 (stating that “presentation of the waiver form on the day of the transaction 
contradicted the very purpose of the cooling off period: to give the consumer time to consider the 
terms of her financial commitments”). 
 248.  It is the contradictory statements in the document that precluded clear disclosure of the 
notice of the right to cancel the transaction. See id. at 1147. 
 249.  Smith v. Highland Bank, 108 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 250.  Id. at 1327. Unlike the situation in Rodash, the certificate of confirmation indicating that 
the consumer had not exercised her right to rescind was to be signed after the expiration of the 
three-day rescission period. Id. at 1326. 
 251.  Id. 
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same paragraph that invited a single signature on the date of the 
transaction.252 
The Smith court was not of a mind to go beyond Rodash because 
there was nothing in the document that made the certificate of 
confirmation effective on the same day as the transaction.253 As a matter 
of fact, the provision for separate signatures supported the proposition 
that the consumer’s election not to cancel became effective only after the 
three-day rescission period had expired.254 
When the Eighth Circuit confronted a Smith-like situation in Rand 
Corp. v. Moua, however, it reached a different result simply because it 
believed that the creditor’s form was confusing, given the requirement 
that the consumers had to sign the receipt and the confirmation section 
simultaneously on the date of the transaction.255 Unlike Smith, the 
consumers in Rand confirmed that three business days had elapsed since 
that date and that the consumers had not rescinded.256 In fact, the court 
acknowledged that “[r]equiring borrowers to sign statements which are 
contradictory and demonstrably false is a paradigm for confusion.”257 
This was a little different from Smith because the consumers in Rand did 
not argue that placement of the confirmation and receipt sections in the 
same document led to any confusion. The consumers were asked to 
certify a falsehood, for the three-day rescission period had not yet 
expired when they confirmed that no rescission had occurred. 
C. Postdating and Waiver 
Leaving nothing to chance, some creditors try to avoid problems by 
postdating the consumer’s confirmation that no rescission has occurred. 
The creditor’s explanation in Conrad v. Farmers and Merchants 
Bank,258 that postdating was prevalent in the industry, did not persuade 
 
 252.  See Rodash, 16 F.3d at 1145 n.2. 
 253.  Smith, 108 F.3d at 1327. 
 254.  The certificate of confirmation and the acknowledgment of receipt required separate 
signatures. The form also indicated that the consumer should not sign the certificate of confirmation 
that the consumer had not rescinded until three business days had elapsed. See id. at 1327. The 
certificate of confirmation was dated several days after the acknowledgment of receipt of the notice. 
Id.; see also NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING, supra note 25, § 10.4.4.8. 
 255.  Rand Corp. v. Yer Song Moua, 559 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 256.  The court acknowledged that requiring the consumers to sign contradictory statements 
was “a paradigm for confusion.” Id. at 847. In Smith, the borrower did not sign to certify that the 
three-day rescission period had already passed until it had actually passed. See Smith, 108 F.3d at 
1327. 
 257.  Rand Corp., 559 F.3d at 847; see also Premature Signing of an I-Have-Not-Rescinded 
Form Extends Rescission Period, CONSUMER CREDIT & TRUTH-IN-LENDING COMPLIANCE REPORT, 
May 2009, at 3. 
 258.  Conrad v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 762 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Va. 2011). 
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the court to grant the creditor’s motion to dismiss the consumer’s suit, 
since the practice did not meet the statutory requirement of clear and 
conspicuous disclosure of the right of rescission.259 The creditor’s 
strategy in cases like Conrad is to send a message to the consumer that 
his opportunity to rescind has expired, and this is particularly dramatic 
when the election not to cancel appears conveniently on the same pages 
as the notice of the right to rescind. A creditor may even make things 
murkier by having a single signature line covering both events. That 
scenario leads to even more confusion for the consumer. 
Since a premature election not to cancel is really an attempt to 
produce a waiver of the consumer’s right to cancel, a creditor should be 
restricted to the requirements for such an event.260 Therefore, the 
solution to the problem of a premature election lies in recognizing that a 
waiver is limited to emergency situations, and a consumer should follow 
the prescribed format for accomplishing it. A creditor should understand 
the seriousness of the event by having a separate form that deals only 
with the waiver. This separate treatment should certainly drive home to 
the consumer the importance of the occasion, and would deprive the 
creditor of the opportunity to create a conflicting scenario.261 
A legitimate confirmation of non-rescission can come as soon as 
the rescission period expires, to allay the creditor’s fears that a rescission 
may be lurking in the mail. There is nothing wrong, in principle, with the 
consumer’s speedy assurance to the creditor on the expiration of the 
rescission period that the consumer has not rescinded. The creditor will 
have to wait its three days, but there is no ambiguity in this scenario, and 
the parties will be able to move promptly once the consumer has given 
his assurance. A postdated confirmation only serves to raise questions 
about its legitimacy when there is such great potential for a conflicting 
message about the consumer’s right to rescind. If the parties cannot meet 
 
 259.  See id. at 846. The creditor’s obligation to disclose clearly and conspicuously the 
consumer’s right to rescind a transaction is subject to an objective standard of review. See Rand 
Corp., 559 F.3d at 845-46; Wiggins v. Avco Fin. Servs., 62 F. Supp. 2d 90, 94 (D.D.C. 1999). 
 260.  A waiver is indeed available, but it is restricted to a “bona fide personal financial 
emergency.” 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(e) (2014). Regulation Z emphasizes the seriousness of the waiver 
provision by prohibiting the use of printed forms for that purpose. See id. 
 261.  Regulation Z drives home the point by requiring a creditor to delay its performance until 
the rescission period has expired and the creditor is reasonably satisfied that the consumer has not 
rescinded. Id. § 1026.23(c). If a consumer has mailed his rescission notice within the rescission 
period, the creditor may not receive it for a few days. In this event, the notice would still be 
effective. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING, supra note 25, § 10.5.1. If the 
consumer attempts to rescind by telefax after the rescission period has expired, he will be late even 
if the creditor does not delay performance to accommodate a possible rescission by mail. See Nutase 
v. E. Sav. Bank (In re Nutase), No. 05-21747-WIL, 2007 WL 1704392, at *4 (Bankr. D. Md. June 
11, 2007). 
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the criteria for a true waiver, then the creditor may be better off delaying 
its performance until the consumer notifies it that there is no rescission 
en route. With the parties’ cooperation, the transaction should be 
consummated promptly once the rescission period has expired. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Evidently, the courts cannot agree about when rescission occurs 
within the context of Truth in Lending.262 It is not enough to rely on 
Beach without explaining that the consumers there did nothing before 
the three years had expired, and therefore it was not a question of 
distinguishing a consumer’s notice from a consumer’s lawsuit.263 The 
Beach Court simply clarified that the consumers’ right of rescission had 
expired after three years for purposes of asserting it as a defense and for 
purposes of initiating a lawsuit.264 It said nothing about what it takes for 
a consumer to exercise his right of rescission, and therefore those courts 
that require a consumer’s notice and filing to occur within the three-year 
period stand on shaky ground in relying on Beach for that proposition. It 
is more convincing to rely on the plain language of § 1635, which refers 
to the expiration of a right rather than to the prospect of litigation.265 
There is a legitimate concern that once a consumer gives his notice 
 
 262.  Compare Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 267 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding 
that rescission occurs upon consumer’s written notice); Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 
F.3d 271, 277-78 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that consumers exercised their right to rescind through 
written notice to creditor); Herzog v. Countrywide Home Loans (In re Hunter), 400 B.R. 651, 662 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009) (holding that consumer exercised his right to rescind by notifying the 
creditor within the three-year period required by § 1635), with McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home 
Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that consumer must bring suit within three 
years regardless of any notice the consumer gives within that time); Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, 
USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1188 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding notice by itself is not sufficient for a consumer 
to exercise his right to rescind); Sobieniak v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, 835 F. Supp. 2d 705, 710 
(D. Minn. 2011) (noting the majority view of Congress’s intention is that a consumer must sue 
within three years if he wants to enforce rescission). 
 263.  In Beach, the consumers did not take any action to rescind their loan until the lender 
began foreclosure proceedings more than three years after the transaction. See Beach v. Ocwen Fed. 
Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1988); see also Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 262; Calvin v. Am. Fiduciary 
Mortg. Servs., Inc., No.10-CV-7213, 2011 WL1672064, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2011) (noting that 
Beach determined only that the right of rescission expired after three years but did not determine 
how their right should be exercised). 
 264.  The Beach Court recognized § 1635(f) as governing the underlying right of rescission by 
referring to the expiration thereof at the end of three years. See Beach, 523 U.S. at 417. 
 265.  There is a difference between § 1640(e), which allows a consumer to assert a violation as 
a matter of defense by recoupment even if the creditor brings an action for damages after the one-
year period has expired and § 1635(f) which clearly states that the right of rescission shall expire 
after three years. See Beach, 523 U.S. at 417-18; see also Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 277 (stating that 
neither § 1635(f) nor Regulation Z imposes a requirement that a consumer must file a lawsuit to 
invoke his right to rescind). 
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of rescission, he will take his good time in enforcing his rights if the 
creditor ignores him. This does not mean, however, that a consumer can 
take forever to act on his rescission: a court should be able to use the 
one-year statute of limitations in § 1640(e), which seems applicable to 
any action under § 1640, including one where a consumer has the right 
to rescind.266 This one-year period puts a limit on the consumer’s ability 
to extend indefinitely the time for the consumer to enforce the rights 
flowing from his rescission. In this sense, this situation would be a little 
different from Beach, where the consumers did not take any action at all 
to rescind their loan but wanted to use rescission as a defense in 
foreclosure proceedings.267 One can see how this Beach scenario would 
create uncertainty about a lender’s security, and that is what concerned 
the Supreme Court in that case.268 Where a consumer sends his 
rescission within the three-year period, at least the lender is on notice 
about the consumer’s rescission and the lender is able to resolve any 
problems almost immediately. The creditor also has it within its control 
to seek a judicial determination about the validity of the consumer’s 
rescission while the transaction is relatively new. Surely it is not in the 
creditor’s interest to prolong any uncertainty about the rescission’s 
validity. The creditor has an incentive to resolve matters quickly, for its 
security interest is on the line. 
In the final analysis, the conflict in the courts rests on the 
disagreement about how a consumer exercises his right of rescission. 
Congress gave a clear message about that in § 1635, and the courts 
should not ignore the plain meaning of the statute because of concerns 
about the Beach message, where there was no notice involved and the 
consumer was merely trying to use rescission as a defense after the 
three-year period had expired.269 
 
 266.  It is noteworthy that § 1640(e) does not specifically mention damages or rescission, but 
instead refers to “any action under this section,” meaning § 1640. It is possible that the drafters 
wanted to recognize the consumer’s rescission action through § 1640(a)(3). See NAT’L CONSUMER 
LAW CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING, supra note 25, §12.2.2.4.1 (Supp. 2013). 
 267.  See Beach, 523 U.S. at 411. 
 268.  The Beach Court reflected: “Since a statutory right of rescission could cloud a bank’s title 
on foreclosure, Congress may well have chosen to circumscribe that risk, while permitting 
recoupment damages regardless of the date a collection action may be brought.” Id. at 418-19. 
 269.  See Sherzer v. Homestar Mortgage Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 267 (3d Cir. 2013). In McOmie-
Gray v. Bank of America Home Loans, the Ninth Circuit recognized that § 1635(a) gives an obligor 
a right to rescind and that Regulation Z indicates how an obligor can rescind. See McOmie-Gray v. 
Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2012); 
12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(2) (2014)). Nevertheless, the court did not recognize an obligor’s notice to 
the lender as exercising the right of rescission, but only as advancing a claim where the lender does 
not accept the obligor’s rescission. See id. If the lender does not respond to the consumer and the 
obligor sues thereafter and wins, the question then becomes whether the obligor rescinded the 
transaction and then sought judicial enforcement thereof, or whether rescission would then be 
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There is also confusion about the effects of a consumer’s rescission. 
Despite the language recognizing the voidness of a creditor’s security 
interest, the courts recognize that there is more to this than meets the 
eye. It would be easier to understand the effects of the consumer’s 
rescission if the drafters had included any reference to the voidness of 
the security interest in § 1026.15(d)(4) or Regulation Z when they 
specifically allowed for judicial modification of the timetable for the 
return of any money or property.270 The omission leaves the impression 
that nothing can affect the impact of the consumer’s rescission on the 
security interest, but courts have not been opposed to interpreting 
Regulation Z in a way that denies the automatic voidness of such an 
interest.271 That trend is justifiable, but those judicial efforts are 
necessary only because the drafters have not made it clear that the mere 
exercise of the right of rescission does not always result in the removal 
of the lien on the consumer’s property. This lack of precision leaves in 
doubt the continued existence of the security interest, and thus courts 
have to do the best with what they have. In the same way that § 
1026.15(d)(4) allows for judicial modification of the  rescission 
procedures, so too should the regulation include some language 
clarifying what happens to the security interest once the creditor disputes 
the consumer’s right to rescind.272 The present language seems absolute 
and unconditional, but it leaves the wrong impression. There is no good 
 
effective only when a court says so. After this Article was completed, the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 790 (U.S. 2015), thus resolving the 
circuit split relating to the time when rescission occurs. The Court held that a borrower need only 
give written notice of rescission within three years after consummation and that the borrower does 
not have to sue within three years. Id. at 793. 
 270.  Section 1026.23(d)(4) of Regulation Z provides that “[t]he procedures outlined in 
paragraphs (d)(2) and (3) of this section may be modified by court order.” 12 C.F.R. § 
1026.23(d)(4) (2014). Paragraph (4) omits any reference to paragraph (1) dealing with the voidness 
of the lender’s security interest. See id. § 1026.23(d)(1). 
 271.  See Am. Mortg. Network, Inc. v. Shelton, 486 F.3d 815, 821 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating that 
a consumer’s notification of rescission does not automatically make the security interest void); 
Yamamoto v. Bank of N.Y., 329 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that lender’s security 
interest is not void upon the mere sending of the rescission notice, but only when the consumer is 
determined to have a right to rescind); Hindorff v. GSCRP, Inc., No. 13-CV-00955-PAB-KLM, 
2013 WL 2903451 at *6 (D. Colo. June 14, 2013) (stating that rescission notice by itself does not 
void the transaction); Iroanyah v. Bank of Am., N.A., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1124 (N.D. Ill. 2012) 
(stating that mere issuance of rescission notice does not void lender’s security interest). 
 272.  Compare Am. Mortg. Network, 486 F.3d at 821 (stating that the “unilateral notification of 
cancellation does not automatically void the loan contract”); Yamamoto, 329 F.3d at 1172 (stating 
that when creditor contests consumer’s rescission notice, security interest does not vanish 
automatically); Large v. Conseco Fin. Serv. Corp., 292 F.3d 49, 54-55 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding that 
creditor’s security interest becomes void when a consumer exercises a right to rescind that is 
justified in a particular case), with Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 261 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that contract 
is voided when consumer sends valid rescission notice). 
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reason to leave this matter in limbo. 
Finally, the model form for rescission leaves much to be desired in 
the sense that it puts the burden on the consumer to satisfy himself that 
the specific deadline date for rescission correlates with the alternative 
formulation relating to the third business day following the last of the 
three events attending the transaction. It is more desirable for the 
creditor to assume the responsibility of giving a correct rescission date, 
and that it suffer the consequences of failing to do so. Otherwise, the 
consumer is put in the position of deciding when the third business day 
period expires, if there is any doubt about the specific rescission 
deadline. The creditor should be expected to stand behind its specific 
deadline date and not shift the burden to the consumer to find a 
correlation between that date and the explanatory language that follows 
in the model form. 
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